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I. Introduction
A basic understanding of the law regarding joinder and severance is
essential for any lawyer practicing in the federal criminal courts. Whether a
defendant is tried singly or jointly with co-defendants can play a vital role in
whether that defendant is convicted or acquitted. Likewise, an acquittal may
turn upon whether or not a defendant is tried for one offense at a time or for
multiple offenses jointly. The purpose of this study is to explore the intricacies
of the federal rules relating to joinder and severance in the context of criminal
cases: Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure 8, 13, and 14. Although each of
these rules is concerned with a different aspect of joinder and severance, they are
interrelated. Notwithstanding the fact that these various rules appear fairly
straightforward, federal appellate court decisions have interpreted them in such a
way as to delineate, expand and limit their scope. As a result, it is imperative
for the practicing attorney to refer to those decisions as supplementing the
specific requirements of the federal rules.
Particular emphasis will be paid to the law of the Seventh Circuit. However, in several specific areas of this subject, other circuits have been recognized
as providing authoritative interpretations of the rules. In such areas, those
circuits will be accentuated. Furthermore, the subject of joinder and severance
is one in which federal appellate courts appear to enjoy borrowing of precedent
from other circuits; therefore, a general familiarity with the law of all circuits
is particularly vital in this area and, accordingly, such coverage will be attempted.
II. Rule 8-Joinder
A. Joinderof Offenses Under Rule 8 (a)
Multiple offenses may be joined together for trial purposes regardless of their
nature, i.e., they may be all felonies or misdemeanors or any combination of the
two. Rule 8(a)' permits, but does not mandate, joinder in a single charging
instrument of two or more offenses in separate counts so long as the offenses
charged meet at least one of three tests.
1. Same or Similar Character Test
The first such test is that the offenses joined be of the same or similar character. Hence, it has been held to be permissible for the government to join in a
single indictment two separate charges of bank robbery which were allegedly
committed six days apart, regardless of the fact that different banks were robbed
in each instance.2 Joinder is justified in these circumstances on the ground that
1

Rule 8(a) provides that: (t)wo or more offenses may be charged in the same
indictment or information in a separate count for each offense if the offenses charged,
whether felonies or misdemeanors or both, are of the same or similar character or are
based on the same act or transaction or on two or more acts or transactions connected
together or constituting parts of a common scheme or plan.
FED. R. CRim. P. 8(a).
2 United States v. Di Giovanni, 544 F.2d 642 (2d Cir. 1976).
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the modus operandi employed in the commission of each bank robbery was the
same.' Similarly, the Fourth Circuit in United States v. Foutz4 found the "same
or similar character" test satisfied when it upheld joinder of two separate bank
robberies committed two and a half months apart.' And, in Johnson v. United
States,' the Eighth Circuit affirmed joinder of five separate violations of the
Mann Act,' explaining that ". . joinder of offenses is ordinarily appropriate
where, as here, the specific counts refer to the same type of offenses, occurring
over a relatively short period of time and the evidence as to each count of necessity overlaps."'
On the other hand, misjoinder was found to have occurred in United States
v. Graci,9 where the Third Circuit held that joinder of two counts in regard to the
sale of stolen government drugs with another count charging delivery of different
drugs over two years later was improper. The court commented that since the
latter count did not involve drugs owned by the government, it was clear that the
offenses were not of the same or similar character."
The Seventh Circuit in United States v. Quinn" failed to find the "same or
similar character" test met, when the government joined in a single indictment
four counts concerning two transactions conducted three months apart. The
first two counts, relating to the first transaction, alleged that the defendant, a
director of a federally insured savings and loan association, misapplied the
association's funds with intent to defraud when he obtained a rent prepayment
from the association for his private business concern. The final two counts related
to his having presented a check drawn on his private business concern in exchange for an accommodation check drawn on the savings and loan association,
with knowledge that the check he presented was not covered by sufficient funds.
Although both transactions involved the misapplication by the director of funds
to his private business concern, and thus his personal use, the court found that the
"same or similar character" test was lacking without further explaining its rationale. Unfortunately, many of the judicial dispositions of allegations of improper offense joinder fail, as in Quinn, to provide criteria which would provide
guidance as to the precise scope of this rule.
2. Same Act or Transaction Test
The second alternate test for joinder of offenses is whether the charges are
"based on the same act or transaction." Thus, for example, the court in Quinn
3 Id. at 644.
4 United States v. Foutz, 540 F.2d 733 (4th Cir. 1976).
5 But see the discussion of Foutz, infra at 736-39, where the Foutz court went on to find
Rule 14 required severance at a new trial.
See also Dunaway v. United States, 205 F.2d 23 (D.C. Cir. 1953), where the court found
three counts of housebreaking, each committed on a separate house on a different date all
within a two month period, properly joined under Rule 8(a).
6 356 F.2d 680 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 857 (1966).
7 The Mann Act prohibits transporting women across state lines for the purposes of
prostitution. 18 U.S.C. § 2421 et. seq.
8 356 F.2d at 682.
9 504 F.2d 411 (3d Cir. 1974).
10 Id. at 412.
11 365 F.2d 256 (7th Cir. 1966).
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determined this second standard had not been met either, given its conclusion
that the two occurrences in question were wholly separate acts and transactions.

In order to satisfy this alternative test for joinder, it is merely necessary that
the offenses joined in some way arise out of "the same sequence of events."' 2
This standard seems to be interpreted rather broadly, as is evidenced by examination of the Fifth Circuit decision in United States v. Park," wherein the court
considered the "same act or transaction" test against an appellant's urging that the
offense of manufacture of a controlled substance was misjoined with a gun
charge. Apparently both the drugs and the gun had been uncovered during a
search of appellant's residence, which the appellant alleged provided "an insufficient nexus to say that the charges arose from the same transaction."' 4 In
upholding the trial court's finding of proper offense joinder, the court relied on
United States v. Pietras,'5 a case which involved joinder of the offense of possession of an unregistered firearm with charges of bank robbery and kidnapping.
The firearm had not been used in connection with the bank hold-up or the
kidnapping. Rather, the gun had merely been found in the van which Pietras
had used as a means of escape during the robbery. The Pietras court explained
that "[t]here is no prerequisite to joinder that the firearm be used in the commission of the robbery."' 6 It seems clear in cases involving gun charges, that when
the firearm is uncovered in any way as a result of a separate offense, a connection
between the offenses sufficient to justify their joinder will be found.
The Park court, in reaching its conclusion, undertook to define "transaction" as
"a word of flexible meaning. It may comprehend a series of many occurrences, depending not so much upon the immediateness of their connection
as upon their logical relationship." Moore v. New York Cotton Exchange,
1926, 270 U.S. 593, 610, 46 S. Ct. 367, 371, 70 L. Ed. 750, 757; accord,
United States v. Friedman, supra, 445 F.2d at 1083; Cataneo v. United
States, 4 Cir. 1948, 167 F.2d 820, 823; United States v. Mikelberg, 5 Cir.
1975, 517 F.2d 246, cert. denied, 424 U.S. 909 (1976) .3.
The court added:
In Cataneo v. United States, supra, the court in construing the word
"transaction" as used in Rule 8 stated that it "involves the balancing of conflicting interests: (1) speed, efficiency, and convenience in the functioning
of the federal judicial machinery; against (2) the right of the accused to
a fair trial, without any substantial prejudice to that right occasioned by the
joinder of offenses and/or defendants." (citations omitted)'s
12 United States v. Abshire, 471 F.2d 116, 118 (5th Cir. 1972), affirming joinder of the
offense of transporting a stolen motor vehicle with the charge of transportation of a firearm by
a felon.
13 531 F.2d 754 (5th Cir. 1976).
14 Id. at 761.
15 501 F.2d 182 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1071 (1974).
16 531 F.2d at 761 (citing Pretras,501 F.2d at 185).
17 Id. See also United States v. Isaacs, 493 F.2d 1124 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 417
U.S. 976, for nearly identical language.
18 531 F.2d at 761.
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3. Two or More Acts or Transactions Connected Together or Constituting
Parts of a Common Scheme or Plan
The third test for Rule 8(a) joinder arises when more than a single act or
transaction is found to have occurred. In such instances, joinder may be justified
if the several acts or transactions are determined to be somehow "connected
together or constituting parts of a common scheme or plan."' 9
A typical case of "common scheme or plan" joinder was presented to the
United States Supreme Court in 1894 in Pointer v. United States.2" The defendant had been accused of the murders of two men, one immediately preceding
the other. The Court, in upholding the joinder, remarked that "[t]here was
such close connection between the two killings, in respect of time, place and
occasion, that it was difficult, if not impossible, to separate the proof of one
charge from the proof of the other."'" Another example of such joinder is found
in United States v. Barrett,2" where the defendant's motion to sever mail fraud
charges from bribery and tax evasion charges had been denied by the trial court.
On appeal, the Seventh Circuit found that, since all offenses were connected with
the defendant's use of his public office for personal gain, the "common scheme
or plan" requirement was met, and the separate acts were properly joined. In
another Seventh Circuit opinion, United States v. Isaacs,2 appellant and exgovernor, Otto Kerner, had objected to the joinder of a perjury count with
various substantive counts. involving race track stock fraud. The court, in rejecting this view, reasoned that all the offenses were logically related to one
another. "They are all connected with, or arose out of, a common plan to corruptly influence the regulation of horse racing. The perjury charge against
Kerner related to his involvement with the racing industry, and evidence of that
involvement was pertinent to the proof of the other offenses." 24
In some cases, the courts seem to allow offense joinder under this test if
they merely uncover between the separately committed offenses some common
basis in terms of time of the commission of the offenses or in terms of motive
behind the wrongdoings. An example of the former is United States v. lines"
wherein joinder of separate transactions was upheld by the Eighth Circuit where
the defendant was appealing his conviction for possession of an unregistered firearm and distribution of heroin on the ground of misjoinder under Rule 8(a).
The court, however, noted that "[b]oth offenses involved the sale of contraband
and they were committed on the same day. The [same] two detectives observed
both transactions. Thus the proof of the offenses was overlapping to some
extent.1 26 An illustration of the latter approach is United States v. Gorham,"
19 FED. R. CRIM. P. 8(a).
20 151 U.S. 396 (1894). Pointer, a pre-Rules decision, has been nonetheless relied on by
a number of courts in upholding joinder under the federal rules.
21 Id. at 404.
22 505 F.2d 1091 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 964"(1975).
23 493 F.2d 1124 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 976 (1974).
24 Id. at 1159.
25 536 F.2d 1255 (8th Cir. 1976).
26 Id. at 1257.
27 523 F.2d 1088 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
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in which the D. C. Court of Appeals rejected the appellants' argument that
joinder of two separate escape offenses was improper because the two escapes
were "disparate offenses." 2 Instead, the court found the two escapes sufficiently
related to come within the ambit of Rule 8(a), since the jury had found that
the appellants were engaged in a conspiracy to escape. Moreover, the two
offenses "arose out of a continuing state of affairs, i.e., appellants' dissatisfaction
with their confinement in jail and their strong desire to escape .... ""
Sometimes it appears any type of "relationship" between the offenses will
satisfy this standard. In United States v. Quinones,"0 the defendant was appealing from a conviction on charges of entering military property with an unlawful
purpose, rape, and assault with a dangerous weapon, all stemming from events
which transpired on a single evening, as well as a charge of escape from custody
pursuant to an arrest several days after the assault and rape. The defendant contended that the trial court erred in joining the escape count with the prior three
charges. What is interesting about this case is that defendant's arrest was pursuant to a wholly different incident for which he was wanted, but which charge
was subsequently dismissed. Nevertheless, the court found that the arrest "warrant's execution, hence defendant's custody, was a direct result of the happenings
charged in the other counts for which he was tried. Thus, they may be deemed
'connected together,'

. . .

and joinder was proper."'"

In contrast, the joinder of offenses in United States v. Quinn 2 was found
violative of Rule 8(a) joinder under the "common scheme or plan" test. There,
the Seventh Circuit found that allegations of the misapplication of a savings and
loan association's funds with intent to defraud, which occurred on two separate
occasions three months apart, were separate transactions "not connected as part
of a common scheme"33 and therefore misjoined. Here it appears the time differential was critical.
4 the court was presented
In Baker v. United States,"
with one of the more
complex situations of offense joinder. The indictment contained nine counts,
four of which were properly joined as similar offenses in that each charged tax
evasion. The remaining five were theft charges which were likewise properly
joined among themselves. Four of the theft charges were determined properly
joined with one of the tax evasion counts, on the ground that the tax evasion
count arose from the fact that the defendant had failed to report on his tax
return the stolen cash. The question presented to the court, however, was
whether all nine counts were properly joined, when various groupings of the
nine counts could satisfy any one of the tests for joinder, but all nine, when considered as a whole, could not. The court concluded that proper joinder of each
count to every other was necessary; and, as a result, the union of all nine counts

28
29
30
31
32
33
34

Id. at 1093.
Id. at 1094.
516 F.2d 1309 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 852 (1975).
Id. at 1312.
365 F.2d 256 (7th Cir. 1966).
Id. at 264.
401 F.2d 958 (D.C. Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 965 (1970).
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Thus, a nexus between each offense, even if weak,
constituted misjoinder.3
must exist.
In sum, the three tests for offense joinder may be illustrated by the following:
Under the "same or similar character" test for offense joinder, it would be permissible to charge a single defendant in the same indictment with both conspiracy
to rob Bank X in Chicago and with robbery of Bank Y in Chicago in violation of
federal law even though the offenses are unrelated except in character." Under
the "same act or transaction" test, it would be permissible to join for trial purposes the substantive offense of robbing Bank X in violation of federal law and
conspiracy to rob that bank. Under the "two or more acts or transactions connected together or constituting parts of a common scheme or plan" test of Rule
8(a), if the defendant allegedly committed the substantive offense of robbing
Bank Y, conspiracy to rob that bank, and kidnapping of Bank Y's guard (for
hostage purposes) all in violation of federal law, the three charges would be appropriately joined in a single indictment. Finally, if in a subsequent search and
seizure in furtherance of the robbery and kidnapping investigation, an unregistered firearm were discovered, the offense of possession of that gun could
be properly joined for trial with the bank robbery, conspiracy and kidnapping
charges.
B. Joinder of Defendants Under Rule 8(b)
Joinder of charges against multiple defendants is controlled by Rule 8(b),"
not Rule 8(a).38 Nevertheless, the two subdivisions of Rule 8 are alike with one
important exception. Whereas Rule 8(a) employs a test which may be satisfied
in one of three ways, Rule 8(b) acts as a limitation on the joinder of offenses
when more than one defendant is charged, and instead looks to a test which may
be satisfied in only two ways.
The major distinction between the two sections is that, unlike Rule 8(a),
joinder of offenses which are of the same or similar character is clearly impermissible under Rule 8(b), whenever defendants are joined as well. In United
39
two counts in an indictment were joined in contravenStates v. Marionneaux,
tion of this principle. In reversing the trial court, the Fifth Circuit decreed the
standard for joinder when there exist both multiple offenses and offenders.
Although Counts I and II of the indictment under scrutiny charge offenses
of the "same or similar character," which might be joinable under subsection
(a), the identity or similarity of the character of offenses is not a permissible
35 But see notes 109-29 infra and accompanying text regarding the court's determination
that the effect of that misjoinder was harmless error.
36 See, e.g., United States v. Foutz, 540 F.2d 733.
37 Rule 8(b) provides:
Two or more defendants may be charged in the same indictment or information if
they are alleged to have participated in the same act or transaction or in the same
series of acts or transactions constituting an offense or offenses. Such defendants may
be charged in one or more counts together or separately and all of the defendants
need not be charged in each count.
FED. R. CRIM. P. 8(b).
38 United States v. Roselli, 432 F.2d 879, 898 (9th Cir. 1970).
39 514 F.2d 1244 (5th Cir. 1975).
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basis for the joinder of defendants under subsection (b). To be joined as
defendants in the same indictment under Rule 8(b), [each accused] must
be alleged to have participated (1) in the same act or transaction or (2) in
the same series of acts or transactions constituting an offense or offenses. 40

In accord with this proposition is United States v. Whitehead,4 in which the
trial court was found to have applied an incorrect standard when it permitted the
joinder of two defendants on the basis that the charges contained in the indictment were of a similar character. Both defendants were alleged to have sold
cocaine to the same buyer thirteen days apart. Finding the offenses wholly "independent crimes, engaged in separately, without concert of purpose,"4 the appellate court reversed defendant's conviction.
Although the "same or similar character" test is inapposite in regard to the
question of the joinder of defendants, the two latter tests of Rule 8(a) offense
joinder are clearly applicable to Rule 8 (b) joinder, which is concerned with the
joinder of defendants in a single charging instrument. As articulated by the
Ninth Circuit in United States v. Roselli,43
[i]t is irrelevant that Rule 8(a) permits charges "of the same or similar

character" to be joined against a single defendant, even though they do not
arise out of the same or connected transactions. Charges against multiple
defendants may not be joined merely because they are similar in character;
... and even dissimilar charges may be joined against multiple defendants
if they arise out of the same series of transactions constituting an offense or
offenses .... Except for this difference, the test for joinder under the two
provisions is the same. 8 MooRE's FEDERAL PRACTICE 8-23, 8-24. 41

As a result of the similarity in language between Rule 8(b)'s dual provisions45
and the "same act or transaction" and "two or more acts or transactions connected together or constituting parts of a common scheme or plan" tests of Rule
8(a), courts generally treat the standards as substantially the same for purposes
of discussion. Exemplary of this tendency in regard to the latter two tests of
Rule 8(a) is Judge Kerner's opinion for the Seventh Circuit, which appended
Rule 8(a)'s "common scheme or plan" provision onto Rule 8(b)'s "same series
of acts or transactions" test:
40 Id. at 1248.
41 539 F.2d 1023 (4th Cir. 1976).
42 Id. at 1023.
43 432 F.2d 879 (9th Cir. 1970).
44 Id. at 898. See also United States v. Bova, 493 F.2d 33, 35 (5th Cir. 1974), for the
proposition that "[Wjhether there has been misjoinder in a trial involving multiple defendants
is governed by Rule 8(b) only; Rule 8(a) has no application in such instances" (citing Cupo
v. United States, 359 F.2d 990, 992 (D.C. Cir. 1966); King v. United States, 355 F.2d 700, 704
(1st Cir. 1966); WRIGHT, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, CRIMINAL § 144 (1969)).
Nevertheless, in cases involving both multiple defendants and multiple offenses, courts
look to both rules, depending upon the nature of the appellant's claim. See, e.g., United States
v. Isaacs, 493 F.2d 1124 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 976 (1974), United States v.
Gorham, 523 F.2d 1088 (D.C. Cir. 1975) ; United States v. Graci, 504 F.2d 411 (3d Cir. 1974) ;
United States v. Amick, 439 F.2d 351 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 403 U.S. 918 '(1971); and
United States v. Scott, 413 F.2d 932 (7th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1006 (1970),
where the courts inter-related discussions of Rule 8(b) with Rule 8(a).
45 As prerequisites to the joinder of multiple defendants Rule 8(b) requires that defendants
be "alleged to have participated in the same act or transaction or in the same series of acts or
transactionsconstituting an offense or offenses." (emphasis added).
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The question then . . . is whether the defendants participated in the same
series of transactions. The test of whether the acts of the defendants are

part of a series of transactions depends on the existence of a common p'an.
* * * [U]nder Rule 8(b) a conclusion that acts were part of a common plan
should be based on such factors as whether the transactions have occurred
in the same
place, within a short period of time and using the same modus
46
operandi.
Inherent in Rule 8(b)'s restriction of joinder to defendants involved in (1)
the same act of transaction or (2) the same series of acts or transactions is the
principle that defendants charged with unrelated offenses may not be indicted
and tried together. Rather, there must exist some link among all of the defendants before joinder is proper.4 1 Consequently, in United States v. Gougis,48
reversal of defendant's conviction was compelled on the ground that joinder of
defendants was improper when no evidence connected defendant, Gougis, to
certain counts involving only his co-defendants. The indictment at issue charged
five separate offenses and three defendants with the sale, transportation and concealment of heroin. Appellant, Gougis, was charged in three of the five counts.49
Because the remaining two counts were totally unrelated to Gougis and the
offenses involved were not alleged to have been part of a "series" of transactions,
the defendants were found by the Seventh Circuit to have been misjoined in
violation of Rule 8(b).
In some cases, the requisite nexus for defendant joinder is established by
demonstrating an evidentiary link between the offenses allegedly committed by
the respective defendants. This occurred in United States v. Gill." The indictment in Gill contained three counts, the first charging both Gill and his codefendant, Fahey, with extortion, while counts II and III each charged Gill and
Fahey individually with perjury before the grand jury which had investigated the
joint extortion charge. The court acknowledged that "[w]ithout the nexus
between the alleged extortion and the separate false declarations (the perjury
charges), there would have been impermissible joinder under Rule 8 (b).... .""
Instead, the court found that the three counts were all part of the same transaction, as "[t]he same evidence adduced to prove the Government's charge under
Count I was used to prove Counts II and III."" 2
The "same evidence" rationale was likewise utilized by the court in United
States v. Isaacs,53 in which the Seventh Circuit reasoned that joinder was proper
since "[t]he evidence to establish the counts in question was pertinent to proof of
other counts....
Isaacs, however, presented a more complex joinder problem.
There, two defendants were faced with a nineteen count indictment charging
46 United States v. Scott, 413 F.2d 932, 935 (7th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1006
(1970) (emphasis added).
47 See Ingram v. United States, 272 F.2d 567, 569, (4th Cir. 1959).
48 374 F.2d 758 (7th Cir. 1967).
49 Rule 8(b) permits that "[A]ll of the defendants need not be charged in each count" of
the indictment. FED. R. CRI M. P. 8(b).
50 490 F.2d 233 (7th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 968 (1974).
51 Id. at 238.
52 Id.
53 493 F.2d 1124 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 976 (1974).
54 Id. at 1159.
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conspiracy, mail fraud, bribery, perjury, the making of false statements to an
I.R.S. agent and in their individual tax returns, and finally tax evasion. Thirteen
of the counts charged both defendants jointly, four charged Kerner individually,
and three charged Isaacs with separate offenses. On appeal, Isaacs contended
that joinder of the counts charging Kerner separately for perjury and tax violadons with the counts involving conspiracy, mail fraud and bribery was improper.
In response, the court stated that, since the separate offenses charged against
Kerner individually were generated by the underlying joint crime, the offenses
may be deemed to have been committed as part of the "same series of acts or
transactions" and thus properly joined under Rule 8(b)."
In reaching its conclusion in Isaacs, the court also relied in part on the
reasoning of United States v. Rosell" and United States v. Granello,5" both of
which were concerned with the joinder of separate counts of income tax evasion
against multiple defendants. The issue as to when individual income tax offenses
(such as a single defendant's failure to report income on one's tax return) against
separate defendants may be joined for trial turns on the nature of the underlying
joint activity. Roselli and Granello suggest that before such offenses may be
joined, some joint offense must be charged against both defendants. In general,
the rule is that the individual income tax offenses against defendants may be
joined for trial only when the joint activity in which the co-defendants were
jointly engaged and from which the unreported income was generated, is in and
of itself illegal. Thus, in Roselli, joinder was upheld when defendants' separate
income tax violations were the result of joint gambling and racketeering operations, activities clearly illegal in themselves.5 8 In contrast, joinder in Granello
was found to be improper where two defendants failed to report on their individual tax returns income which had been earned from a joint business activity
which was not per se illegal. Consequently, the separate tax violations could not
have been construed to be part of the same act or "series of acts or transactions,"
since there existed no underlying offense to provide the nexus between the two
defendants. Accordingly, this approach provides rather straightforward guide-.
lines for joinder of defendants in tax evasion situations.
Individual offenses committed by different defendants are often joined by
the inclusion of an allegation that the respective offenses were part of a single
conspiracy. It must be pointed out that, although the government often utilizes
the addition of a conspiracy count in order to facilitate the finding of a more
concrete nexus among the joined defendants and their separate offenses, it is not
necessary that defendants be charged with conspiracy to satisfy the joinder provisions of the federal rules. 9 Illustrative of the joinder of defendants with no
conspiracy count is the case of United States v. Scott,"0 where a three count in55 Id.
56 432 F.2d 879 (9th Cir. 1970), cert denied, 401 U.S. 924 (1971).
57 365 F.2d 990 (2d Cir. 1966).
58 In accord is United States v. Beasley, 519 F.2d 233 (5th Cir. 1975), also involving the
addition of an income tax offense against two of the four defendants. There, the underlying
joint activity which generated the subsequent income tax violations was a conspiracy to distribute heroin.
59 United States v. Scott, 413 F.2d 932, 934 '(7th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1006
(1970).
60 Id.
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dictment charged three defendants with secreting United States mail. Count I
charged Scott alone; count II charged Scott and one other; and count III
charged Scott and two others. Each count pertained to the secretion of mail
upon a different date. Although not all defendants were charged in each count,
and despite the fact that no conspiracy was alleged, Judge Kerner affirmed
defendants' joinder as proper based upon evidence that the separate transactions
were part of a common plan forming a sufficient connection among all the
defendants. All three defendants were postal employees working at the same post
office, and each instance of mail secretion involved the same modus operandi.
On the other hand, in United States v. Whitehead,6 the court found that
absent any evidence of a common scheme or plan between two defendants, each
charged with the distribution of cocaine in a separate count, although the government had requested the court to infer the existence of a criminal relationship
from the fact that both defendants resided in the same apartment building and
had sold cocaine to the same buyer. In reversing the joinder, the court elaborated:
The burden is on the government to show that persons to be joined participated in the same act or transactions, or in the same series of acts or
transactions. Although there was a "series" of transactions involving a common denominator. . . , the government did not meet its burden of proving
that there was any connection between appellant's offense and [his codefendant's] offense. Carried to its logical conclusion, the government's
theory might well allow us to join in a common indictment and trial two
delinquent taxpayers who use the same accountant. Such a result approaches
the ridiculous.6 2
C. Special Problems Presented in Conspiracy Cases
Often, the government will make use of an additional count charging conspiracy in an effort to facilitate a court's finding of a more concrete connection
among joined defendants and their offenses. For example, in United States v.
Amick, 3 joined in one indictment were forty-one counts, the last of which
alleged a conspiracy by defendants to commit the forty various substantive offenses arising out of sales of common stock, thereby defrauding purchasers of a
newly formed corporation. Appellants were eleven individuals as well as two
corporations. The court had no difficulty in finding that the acts alleged in all
forty-one counts constituted one series of acts or transactions for the purpose of
Rule 8(b). In doing so, the court employed the 8(a) standard:
All the substantive offenses were violations of the [same] securities act, involved the same security, and were alleged to have occurred during the
duration of the alleged conspiracy. We have no doubt that at the least the
acts and transactions upon which all 41 counts were based were "connected
together or constituting part of a common scheme or plan."64
61

539 F.2d 1023 (4th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 97 S. Ct. 1691 (1977).

62

Id. at 1025.

63

439 F.2d 351 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 403 U.S. 918 (1971).

64

Id. at 360.
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However, the simple inclusion of a conspiracy count is insufficient to provide
the requisite connection when, in fact, the various joined counts are not based
on two or more transactions which constitute parts of a common scheme or
5 in
plan. Such was the conclusion of the court in United States v. Spector,"
which four defendants were charged in a nine count indictment with conspiracy
and eight substantive offenses of making false statements to the Federal Housing
Administration. Appellant Scott, however, was charged only with conspiracy.
The conspiracy alleged in Count I had ended before the first substantive offense
was alleged to have occurred. In support of his finding of misjoinder, Judge
Swygert, speaking for the Seventh Circuit, reasoned that, since. "[p]roof of the
conspiracy would not cover the events relating to the [substantive charges] ...
similarly, and the proof of the substantive charges would not relate to the conspiracy,"6 the acts alleged were not part of the same series of acts or transactions.
When defendants are properly charged with a single conspiracy, joinder is
permissible based on the rationale that the defendants participated in the same
series of acts or transactions constituting the offense or offenses, thus satisfying
Rule 8(b)'s requirement."7 However, when multiple conspiracies are charged
or proven, the "same series of acts or transactions constituting the offense or
offenses" test may or may not be satisfied, depending upon the facts of the case
in question.
For example, in United States v. Levine,"s "the government relies on .. .
a ubiquitous conspiracy charge, to provide a common link between... otherwise
unrelated transactions and to demonstrate the existence of a common scheme
or plan among the several defendants."6 9 In actuality, the Fifth Circuit Court of
Appeals found, instead of one conspiracy as charged, two separate conspiracies
involving different defendants at different times, yet with certain defendants common to both conspiracies."0 Reasoning that the government had failed to
establish "that a bridge sufficient to satisfy rule 8 (b) joinder existed between the
defendants ...,",the court vacated appellants' convictions. The government
had urged that, since the defendants were tied together on the face of the pleadings, the court was precluded from looking behind the indictment to determine
whether or not Rule 8(b) had been fulfilled. The court disagreed, saying:
[When] the defendant can show that the charge of a joinder of defendants
in conspiratorial action is based on a legal interpretation that is improper,
the court cannot base its 8(b) ruling on the written [indictment] alone but
must determine
if, under correct legal theory, joint action was actually in72
volved.
65 326 F.2d 345 (7th Cir. 1963).
66 Id. at 330.
67 See, e.g., United States v. Johnston, 547 F.2d 282 (5th Cir. 1977).
68 546 F.2d 658 (5th Cir. 1977).
69 Id. at 662-63.
70 The indictment contained five counts, the first of which charged conspiracy, counts two
and three charged four defendants with the interstate transportation of an obscene film by a
common carrier and interstate transportation of an obscene film for sale and distribution.
Counts four and five contained identical charges against two additional defendants not charged
in counts three and four.
71 546 F.2d at 662.
72 Id. at 663.
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The court added:
The only real underpinning for the government's conspiracy count was the
false legal premise that proof of proximate or simultaneous conspiracies with
one common
73 conspirator was sufficient to establish the existence of a single
conspiracy.
United States v. Marionneaux' involved a similar fact pattern. There, two
conspiracies were charged, yet only one defendant was common to both counts.
Although both conspiracies were, in part, schemes to prevent witnesses from
testifying against Partin, the common co-conspirator, the court pointed out that
"[a] 'series' of acts under Rule 8(b), F. R. Crim. P., is something more than
'similar acts.' "" In reversing defendants' convictions, the court held that
"[w]here, as in the case sub judice, there is no substantial identity of facts or participants between the two offenses, there is no 'series' of acts under Rule 8(b)."7"
On the other hand, joinder of separate conspiracies has been upheld when
the two separate conspiracies are found to have been part of the "same series of
acts or transactions" within the ambit of Rule 8(b). Such a situation was
presented in United States v. Crockett,7 where three defendants were charged
with two conspiracies and one defendant was common to both. The first count
charged Crockett and his son with conspiracy in the operation of an illegal
gambling business, while the second charged Crocket and the local sheriff with
conspiracy to obstruct the enforcement of gambling laws. The court explained
that, because the two conspiracies were both related to the defendants' gambling
operations, the "same series of acts or transactions" test of Rule 8(b) joinder
was in fact met.
1. Variance of Proof
To be distinguished from the preceding cases is the variance of proof
problem presented in United States v. Varelli,8 where the government mischarges
defendants (as a result of its failure to discern the sometimes subtle distinction
between single and multiple conspiracies) with a single conspiracy, when in fact
two or more conspiracies are thereafter proved to have existed." To distinguish
between a single conspiracy, where there must be a single design to accomplish
a common purpose"0 and separate conspiracies, Judge Kerner set out a test,
which subsequent courts have utilized:
If there is one overall agreement among the various parties to perform different functions in order to carry out the objectives of the conspiracy, the
agreement among all the parties constitutes a single conspiracy. However,
73 Id. at 665.
74 514 F.2d 1244 (5th Cir. 1975).
75 Id. at 1248 (citing King v. United States, 355 F.2d 700, 703 (Ist Cir. 1966)).
76 Id. at 1249.
77 514 F.2d 64 (5th Cir. 1975).
78 407 F.2d 735 (7th Cir. 1969).
79 In Crockett, Marionneaux, and Levine, on the other hand, the defendants were charged
with two conspiracies and two were proved.
80 407 F.2d at 741.
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where various defendants separately conspired with a common conspirator
to obtain fraudulent loans from an agency of the United States, . . . there

were several conspiracies since there was no overall goal or common purpose. Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 66 S. Ct. 1239, 90 L. Ed.
1557 (1946). 8
Cases such as Varelli, which involve variance between the pleadings and
the proof present a joinder problem in one or two circumstances. First, if the two
or more conspiracies which are determined to exist are not part of the "same
series of acts or transactions," constituting part of a "common scheme or plan,"
then they are deemed to have been misjoined under Rule 8(b). Secondly, if
multiple conspiracies exist, and the judge fails to properly caution the jury in
regard to the admissibility of evidence against each defendant, then the defendants are likely to have suffered prejudice as a result of the jury's failure to
keep the evidence separate and distinct as to each defendant.
Reversal in cases involving a variance between the number of conspiracies
charged and the number subsequently proved is grounded in Rule 14, rather than
Rule 8(b), on the basis that joinder was initially permissible as satisfying the
"same series of acts or transactions" test, but that prejudice inhered in the
absence of a sufficient cautionary instruction to the jury. In the absence of such
an instruction, it is possible for the jury to transfer guilt across separate conspiracy
lines. This, in United States v. Johnson, 2 reversal of the conspiracy conviction
was mandated because of the possibility of prejudice when a Varelli-type variance
occurred, and the trial court judge failed to give cautionary instructions to the
jury.
On the other hand, although the court in Varelli holds that, whenever the
possibility of variance appears, the court should instruct the jury in regard to
multiple conspiracies," prejudice does not automatically inhere in the absence
of such instructions when in fact only a single conspiracy is supported by the
evidence.84 Of course, whenever the possibility of multiple conspiracies exists,
the court leaves to the jury the decision as to whether the evidence demonstrated
single or multiple conspiracies.85
2. Subsequent Dismissal of the Conspiracy Count
The propriety of joinder under Rule 8(b) is determined from a pre-trial
perspective. The subsequent dismissal of a count on which joinder was predicated
will not render the joinder invalid.8" This principle is especially peculiar to joint
defendants in conspiracy cases, where a conspiracy count which had justified the
original joinder of defendants, fails for want of proof. The Supreme Court in
Schaffer v. United States," the leading case on this question, observed that once
81 Id. at 742.
82 515 F.2d 730 (7th Cir. 1975).
83 407 F.2d at 746.
84 United States v. Abraham, 541 F.2d 1234, 1238-39 (7th Cir. 1976).
85 United States v. Bastone, 526 F.2d 971 (7th Cir. 1975).
86 See also United States v. McDaniel, 538 F.2d 408, 414 (D.C. Cir. 1976) for the fact
that such dismissals do not create double jeopardy problems.
87 362 U.S. 511 (1960).
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defendants are initially properly joined at trial, "subsequent severance [is] controlled by Rule 14."s'
In determining that no Rule 14 prejudice arose in Schaffer, the Court relied
on the fact that the jury was adequately instructed in regard to the evidence
against each defendant. The Court warned, however, that where "the charge
which originally justified joinder turns out to lack the support of sufficient
evidence, a trial judge should be particularly sensitive to the possibility of such
prejudice." 9
The Seventh Circuit addressed the Schaffer question in Brandom v. United
States," where the court remarked that "bad faith" on the part of the government in bringing the ill-fated conspiracy charge would be sufficient to establish
prejudice, and hence reversal would follow. However, the court concluded that a
"[s]ufficient basis is present here to preclude any finding of bad faith [since]
[e]vidence did exist of a common business relationship between all the defendants ... ."" When the Second Circuit in United States v. Branker 2 found
that a conspiracy charge which was dismissed by the judge at the close of the
government's case had been brought in good faith, it offered some criteria for
district courts when it defined "good faith" as the "reasonable expectation that
sufficient proof [of the charge] would be forthcoming at trial."93
This objective standard for determining the government's good faith was at
the same time made more subjective yet more precise in United States v. Ong.9"
In Ong, the appellants argued that tape recordings in the possession of the government conclusively demonstrated that no conspiracy existed between the codefendants, and thus the conspiracy charge was grounded on the government's
bad faith. Although the court agreed with the defendants that the evidence in
the government's possession could not support the conspiracy, it nevertheless
extended the concept of good faith.
[T]he government ostensibly knew that the tapes revealed antagonism and
distrust between Ong and Young that would have impaired any relationship
conducive to the success of the conspiracy. Clearly the government cannot
have acted in good faith unless it had a reasonable expectation that it could
prove Young's participation in the conspiracy despite this contrary evidence.
We find that the government's case, albeit based on a novel and questionable
theory of conspiracy, satisfied this standard. * * * We may not agree that the
law of conspiracy should be extended so far (citation omitted). We do not,
however, equate novelty or even error with bad faith. In the absence of
proof that the government's theory was frivolous or clearly rejected by recent
88 Id. at 515.
89 Id. at 516.
90 431 F.2d 1391 (7th Cir. 1970).
91 Id. at 1396. See also United States v. Nims, 524 F.2d 123, 126 (5th Cir. 1975),
cert. denied, 426 U.S. 934 (1976), in which the conspiracy count was not dismissed by the
trial judge, but rather submitted to a jury which returned a verdict of acquittal. In such a
case, defendants are for all practical purposes foreclosed from showing bad faith, since the fact
that the judge failed to direct a verdict will generally show that the judge found "ample
evidence from which a jury could have found a conspiracy."
92 395 F.2d 881 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1029 (1969).
93 Id. at 887 (quoting United States v. Aiken, 373 F.2d 294, 299 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 389 U.S. 833 (1967)). This standard was adopted by the Seventh Circuit in Brandom
v. United States, 431 F.2d 1391, 1396 (7th Cir. 1970).
94 541 F.2d 331 '(2d Cir. 1976).
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precedent of which it was or should have been aware, we will not find that
an argument
has been prompted by bad faith simply because it is unsuc95
cessful.
As a result of Ong, unless an appellant can demonstrate to the appellate court's
satisfaction that the conspiracy charge was completely frivolous or point to
specific case law rejecting the government's legal theory of conspiracy, good
faith will be found to exist, and the appellant's only recourse will be to attempt to
demonstrate actual prejudice by way of a Rule 14 motion." Of course, if "bad
faith" is proven, the court will conclusively infer the existence of prejudice.

D. Rule 8-Waiver
Barring very unusual circumstances, the failure of a defendant to move to
sever offenses and/or defendants pursuant to Rule 12(b)9" prior to trial and to
renew the motion at the close of the evidence is viewed by some courts as a waiver
of the Rule 8 deficiencies. For instance, in United States v. Harris,the Seventh
Circuit found that defendants were initially properly joined under Rule 8(b)."
However, when the appellant was dismissed from count two, joinder became
improper, because the two defendants were separately charged with two unrelated offenses. Yet, the court found that when the government's motion to dismiss Harris from count two was granted, appellant should have renewed her
pre-trial motion for severance. Instead, she moved unsuccessfully for acquittal
on the count remaining against her, and thus, said the court, waived her objection to misjoinder. In accord is United States v. Quinones,99 where the First
Circuit asserted that defendant waived any claim of misjoinder by failing to
0
move for a severance at trial when he became aware of the misjoinder."'
Not all of the decisions apply the waiver doctrine as vigorously as the cases
95

Id. at 337-38 (emphasis added).

96 It must be pointed out that even if the conspiracy count is brought in good faith by
the Government but is thereafter dismissed, the potential for subsequent prejudice is great and
defense counsel should be especially alert to point out those possibilities to the court. Branker,
supra, is an excellent illustration of this point. In Branker, although the court rejected de-

fendant's claim of bad faith, it nevertheless found reversible error in the trial judge's failure to
sever because of the large number of joined counts (originally 84) and the jury's inability to
compartmentalize the evidence despite adequate cautionary instructions.
97
Any defense, objection, or request which is capable of determination without the trial
of the general issue may be raised before trial by motion ....
The following must be
raised prior to trial:
(2) Defenses and objections based on defects in the indictment or information... ; or
(5) Requests for a severance of charges or defendants under Rule 14.
FED. R. CRIM. P. 12(b).

Joinder which falls outside the criteria of Rule 8 are considered "defects" in the charging
instrument, which are raised under 12(b) (2), while joinder satisfying Rule 8 which is nevertheless deemed misjoinder because of prejudice considerations are objectionable under 12 (b) (5).
98 211 F.2d 656, 659 (7th Cir. 1954). It is not at all clear that the original joinder was
indeed proper, since the two separate offenses were not alleged to have occurred as part of a
series of acts or transactions. Nevertheless, once defendant Harris was dismissed from the
second count, joinder was clearly improper.
99 516 F.2d 1309 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 852 '(1975).
100 Although the court found that defendant had waived his claim, it went on to hold that,
even if there was no waiver, it would find the offenses properly joined. Id. at 1312.
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referred to above. For example, the Seventh Circuit in United States v. Gougis' °'
took a different view of the matter when the defendant argued that he had been
misjoined with his co-defendants in contravention of Rule 8(b). On appeal, the
government urged that Gougis' failure to object to the improper joinder either
before or during trial constituted waiver of the claim. 2 In response, Judge Duffy
explained:
It is true that Rule 12 (b) (2), F.R.Cr.P., requires the defendant to make a
motion before trial if he objects to the joinder. But, the rule also states that
"the court for cause shown may grant relief from the waiver." An appellate court, like the trial court, should not be barred from considering on
the merits whether relief should be granted under Rule 12(b) (2).103
In United States v. Bova,' the government asserted that the defendant was
barred from appealing the Rule 8(b) misjoinder because he did not renew his
pre-trial objection to joinder at trial. The Fifth Circuit, however, stated that the
question of renewal was irrelevant in that, where there has been misjoinder in
violation of Rule 8(b), the trial court has no choice but to sever, and its failure
to do so constituted plain error.'
Thus, it appears that one is not necessarily
precluded from judicial relief for failing to object in timely fashion to Rule 8
deficiencies. The attorney's failure to raise objections prior to trial and to renew
the motion at the close of the evidence, however, is a risk not worth taking, given
the language of Rule 12 and the literal interpretation many of the courts have
given it.
E. Effect of Rule 8 Misjoinder
Whenever the requirements of Rule 8(a) (joinder of offenses) or Rule
8 (b) (joinder of defendants) are not met, misjoinder results. The remedy for misjoinder is simply a severance--separate trials of either defendants or offenses,
depending upon the nature of the misjoinder. However, if defendant fails to
properly object to the misjoinder or his motion to sever is denied, the question is
then left to the appellate court to determine the effect of that misjoinder. The
result of defendant's appeal may vary in accordance to which circuit he appeals,
as well as whether the misjoinder was one of offenses or defendants.
Although it is clear that the "... . granting of a motion for severance, where
there has been a misjoinder, is mandatory and not discretionary with the district
courts . . .""' and that ". . . a trial judge has no discretion to deny a motion
for severance when counts are misjoined, and that to do so would be
error .
,,,207 there is a rift among the various circuits as to whether or not the
101 374 F.2d 758 (7th Cir. 1967).
102 Id. at 761.
103 Id. at 761-62.
104 493 F.2d 33 (5th Cir. 1974).
105 Id. at 35, n. 4.
106 United States v. Bova, 493 F.2d 33, 35 (5th Cir. 1974); United States v. Graci, 504
F.2d 411, 413 (3d Cir. 1974); both citing McElroy v. United States, 164 U.S. 76 (1896).
107 Baker v. United States, 401 F.2d 958, 973 (D.C. Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 400 U.S.
965 (1970).
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trial judge's error may be deemed harmless on review. The harmless error
doctrine, embodied in Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure 52 (a) would obviate
the need for reversal when the appellate court finds that the result of the trial
would have been the same in spite of the error. 08
While the law conflicts among the circuits in regard to the applicability of
the harmless error doctrine in cases of misjoinder and is by no means settled, the
rule which seems to be evolving, very broadly stated, is that Rule 8(a) offense
misjoinder may constitute harmless error, while misjoinder of defendants under
Rule 8(b) mandates a finding of prejudice and hence reversal. Not all circuits
have spoken on both Rule 8(a) and 8(b) misjoinder, but the Third Circuit in
United States v. Grad' 9 has made clear its position on the issue and it is probably
the most far-reaching of any of the circuits. Grad involved both the misjoinder of
defendants and offenses. After finding such misjoinder, the court did not (as
others have) limit its rejection of harmless error to -merely the misjoinder of
defendants. Rather, in finding the harmless error doctrine inapplicable to all
kinds of misjoinder, the court reasoned that
we are dealing with statutory rights expressly conferred. Congress has in
Rule 8 and Rule 13 defined the permissible scope of joint trials of offenses
and offenders. It has in Rule 14 provided a mechanism for protecting against
prejudice even within that permissible scope. It seems a strained interpretation of the harmless error statute that it was intended to dilute statutory
protections expressly granted. The view that violations of Rule 8 and Rule
13 cannot be treated as harmless is expressed by Cipes in 8 Moore's Federal
Practice ff 8.04(2) (1965) and by Professor Wright, Federal Practice &
Procedure, Criminal § 144, at 328-29 (1969).:10
But the District of Columbia Court of Appeals took a contrary stance,
adopting the general rule alluded to above, when it affirmed the appellant's conviction in the face of misjoined offenses. In Baker v. United States,"' appellant
had contended that ".... upon a finding of Rule 8 misjoinder the court must ipso
facto reverse the conviction 'without pausing to consider whether the error was
prejudicial.' ""12 In rejecting appellant's view, the court stated:
As Judge Friendly has said "We see no reason why the undoubted truth
that any appeal claiming misjoinder under Rule 8(b) raises a question of
law in the strict sense, whereas an appeal from a denial of severance under
Rule 14 normally raises only one of abuse of discretion, should carry exemption from the harmless error rule . . . as a corollary." United States v.
Granello, 365 F.2d 990, 995 (2d Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 1019, 87
S. Ct. 1367, 18 L. Ed. 2d 458 (1967)."13
108

"Any error, defect, irregularity or variance which does not effect substantial rights shall

be disregarded." FnD. R. GRIM. P. 52(a).

See also Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967), wherein the Supreme Court
upheld the constitutionality of the doctrine.
109 504 F.2d 411 (3d Cir. 1974).
110 Id. at 414. Nevertheless, the court added that even if it believed that Rule 52(a)
applied, "we would still grant a new trial." Id.
111 401 F.2d 958 (D.C. Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 965 (1970).
112 Id. at 973.
113 Id.
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The court went on to reject Professor Moore's view that any Rule 8 misjoinder
is "conclusively presumed prejudicial."' 14 Instead, it would adopt a "per se" rule
only in regard to Rule 8(b) misjoinder of defendants, with "no further inquiry
into special prejudice . .,5 justified on the ground that
the introduction at the trial of one defendant of evidence which in law is
relevant only to the guilt of another in itself is prejudicial, and it would be
inappropriate to speculate as to the extent to which that evidence may have
affected the deliberations of the jury or embarrassed the defendant in presenting his defense. But in a case where it is clear that "no prejudice from the
joinder could have occurred," we perceive no reason for ignoring the harmless error rule." 6
Finally, at least one circuit takes the position that harmless error may be
applicable to either offense or defendant joinder. The Ninth Circuit in United
States v. Roselli.. seemed, ironically, to focus on the language in Baker to the
effect that when the court finds it clear that no prejudice could have occurred,
then the harmless error rule may be applied, and extended it to the situation
when the misjoinder is of defendants, rather than offenses. The basis of Roselli's
reasoning is, nevertheless, faulty, since it relies on cases where the issue was the
joinder of offenses."' Moreover, the extension would appear to be obiter dicta
in that the court found that defendants had been properly joined under Rule
8(b); yet the court exploited the opportunity to elaborate on the applicability
of the harmless error doctrine to Rule 8(b) situations.
But, as stated, the prevailing rule in the harmless error debate seems to be
the D. C. Circuit position mentioned above. The Eighth Circuit has followed
Baker in regard to the misjoinder of offenses. In United States v. Jines,"9 that
court opined that even in the face of erroneous joinder of offenses, the appellant
must demonstrate clear prejudice before reversal will follow. And, at least three
circuits have expressly held the harmless error doctrine inapplicable to misjoinder of defendants. The First Circuit in King v. United States"' and the
Fifth Circuit in United States v. Bova.' and United States v. Marionneaux"'
have determined that misjoinder of defendants is "inherently prejudicial."
Parenthetically, although both Bova and Marionneaux involved only the joinder
of defendants, the language in Marionneaux is sufficiently broad to cover both
Rule 8(a) and 8(b) situations and could possibly be used as a basis to extend the
Fifth Circuit rule to include misjoined offenses; the Marionneaux court enunciated that "Rule 8, F.R. Crim.P., governs the joinder of offenses and the
joinder of defendants in the same indictment. Improper joinder under Rule 8
114 Id. (citing 8 J. MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE ff 80211] at 8-4 (Cipes ed. 1967)) (emphasis
original).
115 Id.
116 Id. at 973-974.
117 432 F.2d 879, 901 (9th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 924 (1971).
118 Id. (citing Baker v. United States, 401 F.2d 958); United States v. Granello, 365 F.2d
990 (2nd Cir. 1966); Scheve v. United States, 184 F.2d 695 '(D.C. Cir. 1950).

119 536 F.2d 1255, 1257 (8th Cir. 1976).
120
121
122

355 F.2d 700, 703 (1st Cir. 1966).
493 F.2d 33, 35 (5th Cir. 1974).
514 F.2d 1244, 1248 (5th Cir. 1975).
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is inherently prejudicial... .""' Finally, the Fourth Circuit in United States v.
Ingram,14 in concluding that the trial of misjoined defendants cannot be harmless error, articulated that
[tihe rule against jointly indicting and trying different defendants for unconnected offenses is a long-established procedural safeguard. Its purpose
is to prohibit . . .allowing evidence in a case against one defendant to be
presented in the case against another charged with a completely disassociated
offense, with the danger that the jury might feel that the evidence against
the one supported the charge against the other. It is not "harmless error"
to violate a fundamental proceduralrule designed to prevent 'mass trials" 2"
The state of the law in the Seventh Circuit is not so firm. Although both
United States v. Gougis2 6 and United States v. Spector,"' decided by that circuit,
seemed to adopt the Ingram position, the subsequent decision in United States v.
Varelli. 8 contains substantial ominous dicta to the effect that neither Gougis
nor Spector lays down a per se rule in regard to Rule 8(b) misjoinder and would
restrict them to their facts. Rather Judge Kerner, speaking for the court, agreed
with the American Bar Association Advisory Committee on the Criminal Trial
that "a rigid sanction, whereby the prosecutor always would be required to
undertake separate new trials, is unduly harsh."' 29 Accordingly, until the Seventh
Circuit is presented with a case involving- the misjoinder of offenses under Rule
8(a) with the government urging that the error is harmless, it is uncertain
whether misjoined offenses may constitute harmless error in this circuit. On the
other hand, it is probable that this circuit would agree with what appears to be
the majority position that prejudice is innate by the very fact of misjoined defendants and the error could not be harmless.
III. Severance Under Rule 14
However,
Generally, defendants jointly indicted are to be jointly tried."
when a defendant can show that he will be subject to an unfair disadvantage,
Rule 14 provides a mechanism by which a defendant can obtain a separate trial.
Rule 14 provides:
If it appears that a defendant or the government is prejudiced by a joinder
of offenses or of defendants in an indictment or information or by such
joinder for trial together, the court may order an election or separate trial
of counts, grant a severance of defendants or provide whatever relief justice
requires. In ruling on a motion by a defendant for severance the court may
order the attorney for the government to deliver to the court for inspection
123

Id. at 1248 (emphasis added).

124 272 F.2d 567 (4th Cir. 1959).
125 Id. at 570-71 (emphasis added).
126
127

374 F.2d 758, 762 (7th Cir. 1967).
326 F.2d 345, 351 (7th Cir. 1963).

128 407 F.2d 735 '(7th Cir. 1969).
129 Id. at 747, citing 45 MINN. L. REv. 1066, 1073 (1961).
130 United States v. Kahn, 381 F.2d 824, 838 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 1015
(1967); United States v. Bridgeman, 523 F.2d 1099, 1107 (D.C. Cir. 1975); and United
States v. Echeles, 352 F.2d 892, 896 (7th Cir. 1965).

NOTRE DAME LAWYER

[December 1977]

in camera any statements or confessions made by the defendants which the
government intends to introduce at the trial.
Because the decision to grant a severance pursuant to a motion under Rule 14
is within the sound discretion of the trial court judge,' the denial of severance
will not be lightly overturned,'32 and in fact is rarely disturbed on review.' 3
The most basic maxim espoused by reviewing courts in regard to Rule 14
is that only if the defendant proves that the lower court's decision not to sever
constituted a clear abuse of judicial discretion will its decision be reversed. 4 In
practice, courts have been so reluctant to grant severance motions under Rule 14
that one author has suggested its caption be changed from "Relief from Prejudicial Joinder" to "No Relief from Prejudicial Joinder."" 5
Underlying Rule 14 is the notion that a defendant may be prejudiced even
though joinder under Rule 8 was quite proper. Therefore, a trial judge's discretion is addressed to the "likelihood" of prejudice to a defendant in a joint trial."'
Prejudice, as contemplated by Rule 14, is not conceived in the ordinary meaning
of the term. The federal rules have not ensured that jointly tried defendants
receive the same protection as if separately tried.3 7 Rather, the government's
legitimate interests in avoiding "the incremental burden of duplicating a complex
trial or reproducing elusive evidence is a proper consideration in the decision to
deny severance."13' 8 These interests, more often characterized as concerns for
judicial efficiency and economy, have been criticized in that they justify mass
trials on the ground that "the cheapest, easiest way to send a large group of
people to jail is to dispatch them at the same time."'3 9
Nevertheless, the twin goals of judicial efficiency and economy have justified
innumerable joint trials in the face of defendants' claims of prejudice, since a
defendant is not entitled to a perfect trial-merely one which is found to be
"fundamentally fair" when balanced against the government's interests. 4 In
this area, the scales are almost always found to be tipped in the government's
favor, towards joinder and judicial efficiency. Courts commence their reasoning
with the premise that the danger of prejudice can never be entirely eliminated.
Rather, it is the court's duty simply to reduce it to "acceptable proportions."' 4 '
131 Opper v. United States, 348 U.S. 84, 95 (1954); United States v. Hutul, 416 F.2d
607, 620-21 (7th Cir. 1969); cert. denied, sub nom. Sacks v. United States, 396 U.S. 1007

(1970).
132 United States v. Johnson, 478 F.2d 1129, 1131 (5th Cir. 1973).
133 United States v. Crockett, 514 F.2d 64, 70 (5th Cir. 1975).
134 See, e.g., United States v. Johnson, 478 F.2d 1129, 1131 (5th Cir. 1973).
135 Walsh, Fair Trials and the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, 49 A.B.A.J. 853, 856
'(1963). See also Comment, Nelson v. O'Neil: Severance as a Remedy for Bruton Errors, 46
TEMP. L.Q. 111, 121 (1972).
136 United States v. Crockett, 514 F.2d 64, 70 (5th Cir. 1975).
137 See Comment, Nelson v. O'Neil: Severance as a Remedy for Bruton Errors, 46 TEMP.
L.Q. 111, 120 (1972), raising a potential equal protection argument.
138 United States v. Bridgeman, 523 F.2d 1099, 1107 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (citing U.S. v.
Shuford, 454 F.2d 772, 777 (4th Cir. 1971)); See also United States v. Mardian, 546 F.2d 973,
980 (D.C. Cir. 1976) that "in passing on a motion for severance the court must consider not
only the burdens on the prosecution, but also the burdens any new trial would place on the
court, the witnesses, and a new jury panel."
139 Walsh, sup-ra note 135, at 857.
140 Woodcock v. Amaral, 511 F.2d 985, 995 (1st Cir. 1974).
141 Id. at 994.

[Vol. 53:147]

JOINDER AND SEVERANCE IN FEDERAL CRIMINAL CASES

169

To that end, it is the purpose of this discussion to investigate what courts have
deemed to constitute an acceptable level of prejudice-that is, the maximum
amount of partiality permissible before an appellate court will find that a trial
court has clearly abused its discretion in failing to order a severance.
At the outset, it is imperative to recognize that on appeal Rule 14 prejudice
is conceived only in terms of constitutional dimensions. It is most frequently
identified as that prejudice which violates a defendant's constitutional right to a
fair trial. Judge Swygert, speaking for the Seventh Circuit, articulated the
standard which an appellant must meet on review:
A defendant bears the burden of demonstrating that he has been prejudiced
by the joinder; that burden is a difficult one.... joinder must be shown to
have rendered the trial unfair in order to counterbalance the Government's
valid interest, as expressed in Rule 14, in avoiding a multiplicity of trials.-4 2
The concept of fundamental fairness is the very essence of Rule 14 prejudice.

Consequently, in those cases where prejudice has been acknowledged, defendants
framed their disadvantage in terms of a constitutional deprivation. The result
of this constitutional limitation on Rule 14 tends towards the quixotic, since in

practice, the rule is dispensable. In the absence of the rule, an appellant could
still argue the constitutional infirmities of his trial on appeal.
It is fundamental to note, however, that a trial court is not necessarily
limited to a showing of constitutional deprivation. The constitutional analysis
arises on appeal, because appellate courts are wont to find that a trial court

abused its sound discretion in denying the severance motion, unless the denial
has resulted in actual derogation of defendant's constitutionial right to a fair trial.
Thus, trial courts have much greater latitude to conclude that prejudice exists or
is imminent in a joint trial. And, generally, their finding will be upheld on appeal
unless defendant can successfully point to a constitutional deprivation. 4
Although (for obvious reasons) few cases are appealed when the trial court
' illustrates the distinction
grants a severance motion, Garris v. United States"44

between a trial court's and an appellate court's handling of a prejudice claim. In
Garris, the government's motion for severance was granted over defendant's
objection. 4

On appeal, the court emphasized that

".

.

. the test is the same

whether the motion for severance of offenses is made by the prosecution or the
defense, whether there can be a 'fair determination of the defendant's guilt or
innocence....' "' In response to the defendant's argument that the government
was not prejudiced at all, but merely inconvenienced, the D. C. Circuit attempted
to define the amorphous concept of prejudice within the meaning of Rule 14,
142 United States v. Tanner, 471 F.2d 128, 137 (7th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S.
949 (1972) (emphasis added). Accord United States v. Crockett, 514 F.2d 64, 70 (5th Cir.
1975); United States v. McGruder, 514 F.2d 1288, 1290 (5th Cir. 1975).
143 This is so because the standard for ascertaining prejudice changes substantially on appeal. See text accompanying notes 144-47 infra.

144 418 F.2d 467 (D.C. Cir. 1969).

145 It is essential to note that the use of a Rule 14 motion for severance is not limited to
defendants. Although the government palpably .has less need to invoke the motion, it clearly
may do so when it can demonstrate to the trial court's satisfaction that it will be "prejudiced"
by a joint trial. Such was the government's contention in Garris.
146 418 F.2d at 469, n.6.

NOTRE DAME LAWYER

[December 1977]

and suggested that a greater degree of prejudice must be found by a reviewing
court than a district court. From the perspective of a trial court, the requisite
level of prejudice need not be
as great as the prejudice an appellate court must find for reversible error.
. . . Its meaning is not subject to rigid definition, and depends to a con-

siderable extent on the perception of the district judge. Prejudice is not
limited to a showing of irrevocable damage, certain to occur, and impossible
to overcome. Prejudice may also
lie in shouldering substantial risk that a
147
situation will not be remedied.

The standards for determining whether a defendant has in retrospect sustained enough prejudice so as to require severance pursuant to Rule 14 are
judge-made. Therefore, any analysis of Rule 14's application necessitates a
survey of the more common fact situations which appellate courts have ascertained as coming either within or outside the scope of Rule 14 prejudice.
Courts unanimously agree that the fact that a defendant stands a better
chance for an acquittal if he were tried for each offense separately or apart from
co-defendants is an insufficient demonstration of prejudice when balanced against
the countervailing policy of judicial expediency. As the Seventh Circuit stated in
United States v. Allstate Mortgage Corp.:148
Severance will be granted only for the most cogent reasons. The moving
party must show that he will be unable to obtain a fair trial without severance, not merely that a separate trial will offer a better chance for acquittal
(citation omitted). Another statement of the rule is that judicial economy,
efficiency, speed and public interest in avoiding multiple trials dictate
that defendants jointly indicted should be tried together, except for the
most compelling reasons (citation omitted) .149
Thus, even where a defendant characterizes his/her objection in terms of an
increased difficulty in presenting a defense. 5 or that a separate trial would have
offered defendant a strategic advantage,' 5 ' unless he can show in addition thereto
substantial prejudice in the form of a constitutional deprivation which renders
the joint trial fundamentally unfair, appellate courts will uniformly affirm the
denial of defendant's motion for severance. Hence, in United States v. Kahn,'
147 Id. at 470. In Garris, the Court of Appeals thus affirmed the granting of the government's motion for a severance of offenses because the victims of one of the thefts were scheduled
to be out of town during the summer, while the victim of the other theft had since moved out of
state and would be unable to return in the fall due to the fact that she was a school teacher.
148 507 F.2d 492, 495-96 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 999 (1975).
149 Id. See also United States v. Caldwell, 543 F.2d 1333, 1360, n. 137 (D.C. Cir. 1974);
United States v. Gorham, 523 F.2d 1088, 1092 (D.C. Cir. 1975); United States v. Corr, 543
F.2d 1042, 1052 (2nd Cir. 1976); United States v. Park, 531 F.2d 754, 762 (5th Cir. 1976);
United States v. Nell, 526 F.2d 1223, 1230-31 (5th Cir. 1976); United States v. Abraham,
541 F.2d 1234, 1240 (7th Cir. 1976); United States v. Serlin, 538 F.2d 737, 743, n.5 (7th
Cir. 1976); United States v. Bastone, 526 F.2d 971, 983 (7th Cir. 1975); United States v.
Isaacs, 493 F.2d 1124, 1160 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 976 (1974); United States
v. Cervantes, 466 F.2d 736, 739 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 886 (1972); United States v.
Blue, 440 F.2d 300, 302 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 836 (1971).
150 See Johnson v. United States, 356 F.2d 680, 682 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S.
857 (1966).
151 United States v. Cravero, 545 F.2d 406, 412 (5th Cir. 1976).
152 381 F.2d 824 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 1015 (1967).
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for example, the court found no abuse of discretion in the trial court's denial of
severance, when the defendant did not show a "clear likelihood of confusion in
3
the jurors' minds so great as to prejudice the defendants ....
Despite the appellate courts' conservative view of prejudice, there exist
certain situations where appellate courts have found substantial prejudice more
likely to occur. It should be recognized, however, that there are no limits as to
what a defendant may on appeal contend caused him to be substantially prejudiced in his defense. The more common grounds raised on appellate review
are the subject of the following discussion.
A. Application of Rule 14 to Joined Offenses
1. Joinder of Perjury and a Substantive Offense
One area once the subject of Rule 14 motions for severance now appears
to have become settled in the Seventh Circuit. It is clear- that a defendant will
not be found to have suffered prejudice by the mere fact that (s)he was tried
jointly for perjury in addition to the underlying substantive offense. 54 Nor is the
objection of Rule 8 (a) misjoinder available to a defendant faced with the joinder
of such offenses. Because the perjury charge usually emanates from the accused's testimony in regard to the substantive charge, joinder of the offenses is
consistent with the provisions of Rule 8(a) permitting offense joinder so long as
the offenses arose as part of the same series of acts or transactions or part of a
common scheme or plan.' 55
The rationale for the courts' adamant refusal to recognize even the potential
for prejudice in such situations was set out in the seminal case of United States
5 in response to the appellant's concern that the petit jury's awareness
v. Pacente,"'
that the grand jury had disbelieved him would affect their determination. The
court reasoned that a jury would follow the judge's instructions that defendant's
guilt or innocence in one court should not affect their verdict in another. The
court felt that instructions acted as a "meaningful protection against the possibility that the trial jurors would give weight, in considering whether to convict on
[the extortion count], to the determinations the grand jurors made in indicting
on [the perjury count]."' 5 7 The Pacente rationale was quickly reiterated in
5 where the court simply relied on Pacente to reject
United States v. Braasch,"'
153 Id. at 839 (emphasis added). The court also pointed out that a "strong showing of
prejudice" is necessary before a trial court's decision will be reversed. Id. Accord United States
v. Hutul, 416 F.2d 607, 621 (7th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, sub nom. Sacks v. United States,
396 U.S. 1007 (1970).
154 When an accused testifies before a grand jury, the grand jury may return an indictment charging him/her with perjury as well as the substantive offense under investigation.
155 See, e.g., United States v. Isaacs, 493 F.2d 1124, 1159 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 417
U.S. 976 (1974), where the court concluded that because all the offenses charged were connected with, or arose out of a common plan to corruptly influence the regulation of horse
racing, "[t]he perjury charge against Kerner related to his involvement with the racing industry, and evidence of that involvement was pertinent to the proof of the other offenses."
156 503 F.2d 543 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1048 (1974).
157 Id. at 548.
158 505 F.2d 139 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 910 (1975).
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appellant's claim of prejudice, explaining that joinder of perjury with
a con5 9
nected substantive count "has been given full approval by this circuit."'
Nevertheless, the Seventh Circuit's sanction of such joinder has been the
subject of criticism. One commentator has pointed out that, despite the court's
logic, joinder in a single indictment of substantive offenses and a charge of perjury is prejudicial because it
effectively prevents a defendant from testifying on his own behalf, it prevents
him from obtaining untainted witnesses and it may even force him to testify
when he would prefer not to. Despite judicial protestations to the contrary the perjury engendered by such joinder cannot be cured by after-thefact devices such as limiting instructions to the petit jury. 60
2. Specific Types of Prejudice Most Common to Offense Joinder
In Drew v. United States, 6' the District of Columbia Court of Appeals
described three common means by which a defendant may be prejudiced when
offenses are joined against him in a single trial.
(1) [H]e may become embarrassed or confounded in presenting separate
defenses; (2) the jury may use the evidence of one of the crimes charged
to infer a criminal disposition on the part of the defendant from which is
found his guilt of the other crime or crimes charged; or (3) the jury may
cumulate the evidence of the various crimes charged and find guilt when,
if considered separately, it would not so find. A less tangible, but perhaps
equally persuasive, element of prejudice may reside in a latent feeling of
hostility engendered by the charging of several crimes as distinct from only
one. Thus, in any given case the court must weigh prejudice to the defendant caused by the joinder against the obviously important
considerations
16 2
of economy and expedition in judicial administration.
The potential for such prejudice is especially great when offenses are joined
under Rule 8 (a) merely because they are of the same or similar character.
Although the Drew court classified into three separate categories defendants'
most common fears of prejudice, the three types of prejudice necessarily overlap.
Nevertheless, an attempt shall be made to discuss separately each category (i.e.,
defendant's inability to present separate and perhaps inconsistent defenses, the
use of joined offenses to bolster an inference of the accused criminal propensity in
the minds of the jury, and the jurors' inability to effectively discriminate among
evidence presented as to separate offenses).
a. Separate Defenses
In Cross v. United States,'16 Judge Bazelon of the D.C. Circuit recognized
that
159 Id. at 150.
160 Comment, Joinder of Substantive Offenses and Perjury in One Indictment, 66 J.
L. & C. 44, 55 (1975).
161 331 F.2d 85 (D.C. Cir. 1964).
162 Id. at 88.
163 335 F.2d 987 (D.C. Cir. 1964).

Cius.
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[plrejudice may develop when an accused wishes to testify on one but not
the other of two joined offenses which are clearly distinct in time, place and
evidence. His decision whether to testify will reflect a balancing of several
factors with respect to each count: the evidence against -him, the availability
of defense evidence other than his testimony, the plausibility and substantiality of his testimony, the possible effects of his demeanor, impeachment,
and cross-examination. But if the two charges are joined for trial, it is not
possible for him to weigh these factors separately as to each count. If he
testifies on one count, he runs the risk that any adverse effects will influence
the jury's consideration of the other count. Thus he bears the risk on both
counts, although he may benefit on only one. Moreover, a defendant's
silence on one count would be damaging in the face of his express denial of
the other. Thus, he may be coerced into testifying on the count upon which
he wished to remain silent. 64
In Cross, the defendant wished to present a defense only to the second count
of an indictment, but was compelled to forego his fifth amendment right to
remain silent as to count one rather than risk raising an inference as to his guilt
by silence. 16' His alibi defense as to count two was believed by the jury, which
acquitted him. However, the court found his testimony unconvincing as to the
count on which he had preferred not to. testify. The appellate court observed
that "[iln a separate trial of that count the jury would not have heard his admissions of prior convictions and unsavory activities; nor would he have been under
duress to offer dubious testimony on that count in order to avoid the damaging
implication of testifying on only one of the two joined counts."'6 6 In concluding
that appellant was so "embarrassed and confounded' 6 7 in his defense as to constitute prejudice under Rule 14, Judge Bazelon was compelled to distinguish
precedent which had reached a contrary result. The facts presented to the court
in Dunaway v. United States,16 an earlier D. C. Circuit opinion, were substantially identical to those in Cross. Like Cross, Dunaway was acquitted on one
of the two offenses joined for trial. Like Cross, he had testified in regard to the
two offenses without limitation. Yet this same court of appeals had determined
that Dunaway "had a fair choice to take the stand or not uninfluenced to any
significant degree by the consolidation."' 69 In contrast, in Cross, Judge Bazelon
concluded that Cross had no such "fair choice."
It would seem that subsequent courts may choose to follow either the Cross
or Dunaway lead, depending on which result they prefer in advance to reach,
simply by concluding that a defendant had a fair choice or (s) he did not. However, in practice, subsequent courts have uniformly followed Dunaway. Indeed,
the District of Columbia Court of Appeals, in Baker v. United States,".. itself
chose to restrict the impact of Cross. In Baker, the defendant had wished to
testify on seven counts, but remained mute on two. On appeal, defendant relied
164 Id. at 989.
165 Although appellant raised a fifth amendment claim, the court found it unnecessary to
reach the constitutional question, since it concluded that appellant was prejudiced within the
meaning of Rule 14.

166 Cross v. United States, 335 F.2d at 990-91.
167 Id.
168 205 F.2d 23 (D.C. Cir. 1953).
169 Id. at 26.
170 401 F.2d 958 (D.C. Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 965 (1970).
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on Cross for the proposition that "a timely and bona fide election by the accused to testify as to some counts and not as to others requires a Rule 14
severance."' 7 In finding that severance was not required under Rule 14, the
court explained that
[t]he essence of our ruling in Cross was that, because of the unfavorable
appearance of testifying on one charge while remaining silent on another,
and the consequent pressure to testify as to all or none, the defendant may
be confronted with a dilemma: whether, by remaining silent, to lose the
benefit of vital testimony on one count, rather than risk the prejudice (as to
either or both counts) that would result from testifying on the other.
Obviously, no such dilemma exists where the balance of risk and advantage
in respect of testifying is substantially the same as to each count. Thus
unless the "election" referred to by appellant is to be regarded as conclusive
-and we think it should not be-no need for a severance exists until the
defendant makes a convincing showing that he has both important testimony
to give concerning one count and strong need to refrain from testifying on
the other. In making such a showing, it is essential that the defendant
present enough information regarding the nature of the testimony he wishes
to give on one count and his reasons for not wishing to testify on the otherto satisfy the court that the claim of prejudice is genuine and to enable it
intelligently to weigh the considerations of "economy and expedition in
defendant's interest in having a free
judicial administration" against 7 the
2
choice with respect to testifying.

When the Baker court applied its newly defined standard to the facts therein, it
found that the defendant had informed the trial court that his reason for wishing to remain silent on two counts was a fear of potential future prosecutions,
which the court found to be insubstantial. Furthermore, defendant had failed
to describe for the court the nature and importance of the testimony he wished
to offer on the remaining counts. The court further distinguished Cross on the
ground that Cross' prior convictions were introduced as a result of his taking the
stand, whereas in Baker, no such prejudice inhered.'
Several circuits have now followed the Baker court lead. The Fifth Circuit,
in both United States v. Williamson14 and United States v. Parky17 has adopted
the standard for severance set-out in Baker. In both cases, the courts found that
appellants had failed to satisfy the showing mandated in Baker. Likewise, in
Holmes v. Gray,' the Seventh Circuit found Cross inapposite, since the two
offenses had occurred within a short period of time. Rather, the court sided with
the Fifth Circuit's view in Williamson "that severance is not mandatory every
time a defendant wishes to testify to one charge but to remain silent on another.
If that were the law, a court would be divested of all control over the matter of
171
172
173

Id. at 976 (quoting from Cross).
Id. at 976-77.
Id. at 977. But note that in Dunaway, fear of impeachment by defendant's prior

criminal acts did not compel severance.

174
175
176

482 F.2d 508, 512 (5th Cir. 1973).
531 F.2d 754, 763 (5th Cir. 1976).
526 F.2d 622 (7th Cir. 1975). Although this case was based on a petition for habeas

corpus relief following a state court conviction, the Seventh Circuit applied federal standards,
since the Wisconsin Joinder Statute was substantially similar to the federal rules on joinder

and severance.
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severance and the choice would be entrusted to the defendant."' 7 Holmes is
especially noteworthy in that it reached the constitutional issue of whether
defendant's fifth amendment interest was violated. Speaking for the court, Judge
Swygert held that "[w]here joinder is proper and there has been found no substantial prejudicial effect, the Fifth Amendment is not violated1 8because a defendant must elect to testify as to both charges or to none at all." "
Thus, it would appear that trial courts will be unlikely to sustain a defendant's motion for severance when the defendant claims that he fell victim to
the cruel dilemma of wishing to offer a defense to one count but not another.
And it is even more unlikely that an appellate court will find that a trial judge
abused his discretion in denying a defendant's motion on such a ground. Moreover, unless defendant (1) timely informs the court of his decision to testify on
fewer than all counts, (2) identifies to the court's satisfaction the nature of the
testimony he wishes to offer and (3) renders an adequate explanation for preferring not to testify in regard to the other counts, an appellate court may find the
issue waived on appeal or, at the very least, conclude that no prejudice resulted.
Finally, even if defendant satisfies all prerequisites, the court may reason that the
appellant nevertheless enjoyed a "free choice" in regard to his decision to testify
on each count. Thus, while the Cross argument might have some appeal to
individual district courts, federal defense attorneys have little in the way of sound
legal support for the "separate defenses" objection.
b. Evidence of Other Crimes
The law of evidence proscribes the admission into evidence of one crime
in order to prove a defendant's disposition to commit crime." 9 The law, however,
has carved out exceptions to this general prohibition in certain situations where
the probative value of such "other crimes" evidence is found to outweigh prejudice to the defendant. Thus, when evidence of another crime is not offered
solely to establish the accused's bad character to infer criminal disposition, but
rather is relevant to the issue of motive, intent, the absence of mistake or accident,
identity of the accused, knowledge or a common scheme or plan,' then the
evidence is properly admitted.
As a result of these exceptions to the "other crimes" rule, courts reason that
a defendant whose other crime falls within the exceptions would be in no better
position if he were granted separate trials. Therefore, even if an accused is prejudiced in the strict meaning of the term, "separate trials offer no panacea where
the evidence of each of the crimes charged would have been admissible in separate trials."''
Consequently, the District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals
177 526 F.2d at 626. Accord United States v. Lewis, 547 F.2d 1030, 1034 (8th Cir. 1976),
in which the court concluded that the appellant failed to give the district court adequate
notice of his claim of prejudice when he wished to present an alibi defense to one count, but
not another.
178 526 F.2d at 626.
179 MCCORMICK, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE, § 157 (2d ed. 1972). See Drew v.
United States, 331 F.2d 85, 89 (D.C. Cir. 1964) for a discussion of the rationale behind the
"other crimes" rule.
180 331 F.2d at 90.
181 526 F.2d at 625.
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has formulated a two-tiered analysis to be employed when dealing with a defendant's objection to the joint trial of separate offenses. The initial inquiry is
whether or not the evidence of one crime would be admissible at the separate
trial of the other offense. If admissible, under the exceptions to the "other
crimes" rule outlined above, then clearly the defendant is not prejudiced by a
joint trial of the two or more offenses and the inquiry ends. If, on the other
hand, evidence of the other crime would not be permitted at a separate trial,
the court must consider whether or not the evidence "is so separable and distinct
with respect to each crime, and so uninvolved, and the offenses are of such
nature, that the likelihood of the jury having considered evidence of one as corroborative of the other is insubstantial."' 82
It is essential to note that the relevant standard for determining prejudice in
such a case is not the "possibility" that the jury may cumulate evidence, but rather
the "likelihood." Since the danger that the jury will not compartmentalize the
evidence is always present,' 8' a higher potential for prejudice must be demonstrated before a court will reverse the trial court's denial of severance. Thus, in
United States v. Lotsch,"' Judge Learned Hand of the Second Circuit inquired
cc... whether the trial as a whole may not become too confused for the jury," 185
and concluded that, since the evidence as to each count was short and simple,
the jury could keep it separate. 8 6 And in Dunaway v. United States,' defendant's claim of prejudice was rejected, although the evidence would not have
been admissible in a separate trial, because defendant could not show to a substantial likelihood that the jury would be unable to discriminate between the
evidence.
On the other hand, in Drew v. United States,' presently the leading case on
this question, the District of Columbia Circuit determined that the "simple and
distinct" test in regard to the evidence of each crime had not been met. Explaining that "the very essence of this rule is that the evidence be such that the jury
is unlikely to be confused by it or misuse it,"' 89 the court pointed to specific
instances in the record where witnesses' responses indicated confusion as to which
crime they were being questioned about. The court, attributing the confusion to
the fact that the crimes were so similar superficially, warned that when separate
crimes are jointly tried ". . . both court and counsel must recognize that they
are assuming a difficult task the performance of which calls for a vigilant precision in speech and action far beyond that required in the ordinary trial."'8 0
182 205 F.2d at 27.
183 United States v. Lotsch, 102 F.2d 35, 36 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 307 U.S. 622 (1939).
184 Id.
185 Id. at 36.
186 Id. There is dictum in Lotsch to the effect that evidence of other crimes is always
relevant as probative of an accused's criminal disposition, a view explicitly rejected by the
court in Dunaway v. United States, 205 F.2d at 26-27. Nonetheless, Lotsch remains viable in
regard to the question of whether or not a defendant is prejudiced by the admission of
other crimes evidence, but must be read in light of Dunaway and Drew v. United States, 331
F.2d 85 (D.C. Cir. 1964).
187 205 F.2d 23.
188 331 F.2d 85.
189 Id. at 93.
190 Id. at 94.
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The Seventh Circuit, in United States v.Morabette"' and United States v.
Rogers, 9 ' has incorporated into its decision the views espoused by the District
of Columbia Court of Appeals in Lotsch and its progeny.'9 3 Thus, in Morabette,
the court simply concluded that, because the evidence of the offenses-the illicit
operation of two separate distilleries-was so directly connected and the evidence
"offered to sustain proof of one would have been admissible upon the trial of the
other,"'' no prejudice resulted.
Rogers, however, presented a more unique situation. There, appellant was
one of several defendants indicted in a twelve-count indictment. Count twelve,
charging appellant alone, was disposed of through a directed verdict in appellant's favor when the government failed to prove an essential element of the
case. The appellate court, acknowledging that in a separate trial evidence of the
offenses would not have been admissible, still failed to grant appellant relief
since he failed to renew his Rule 14 objection. Because of this waiver, the trial
judge was only bound to analyze the potential for prejudice at the time the
motion was made, and from that perspective, the appellate court found no abuse
of discretion.
Other circuits seem to follow this pattern. Found not to be an abuse of
discretion was the trial court's denial of severance in United States v. Riley,'95
where the Eighth Circuit explained that evidence concerning the theft of a Vega
would have been admissible in a separate trial of the theft of a Cadillac as an
exception to the "other crimes" rule as probative of the defendant's state of mind,
i.e., that he knew the vehicle was stolen. Similarly, in United States V.Park,9 '
the Fifth Circuit found that defendant sustained no prejudice when his previous
drug conviction would have been admissible in a separate trial as probative of
his intent or knowledge. The Drew test was also applied in Baker v. United
States97 to a nine-count indictment. The Baker court found that, as to some of
the offenses, evidence would have been admissible at separate trials. The remaining offenses were found to be "....

sufficiently 'distinct' to enable the jury to keep

[them] separate, thus mitigating to some degree the danger of cumulation."'9 8
Although it disregarded appellant's claims of prejudice, the D.C. Court observed
that ".

.

. it is ordinarily the fact of the defendant's having engaged in prior or

subsequent criminal conduct that is likely to be damaging in the eyes of the jury
rather than the details of its commission."' 99 There is no doubt that this "latent
feeling of hostility""2 against an accused suspected of committing multiple crimes
can affect a jury's consideration. Yet, such allegation standing alone will not
suffice to require reversal.
191 119 F.2d 986 (7th Cir. 1941).
192 475 F.2d 821 (7th Cir. 1973).
193 Indeed, Morabette was relied on by the court in Drew for itsproposition that the admissibility of other crimes evidence in separate trials isa highly significant factor in determining whether joinder is prejudicial. 331 F.2d at 90 n.12.
194 119 F.2d at 988-89.
195 530 F.2d 767, 770 (8th Cir. 1976).
196 531 F.2d 754, 763 (5th Cir. 1976).
197 401 F.2d 958 (D.C. Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 965 (1970).
198 Id. at 975.
199 Id.
200 331 F.2d at 88.
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In sum, even though evidence of a joined offense could not, under rules of
evidence, be admitted at a separate trial, if the evidence of the two or more crimes
is deemed to be "separate and distinct" so as to avoid the likelihood of cumulation
by the jury, then appellant will be deemed unharmed by the joinder, and thus
not entitled to a severance.
c. Cumulation of Evidence
Interrelated with the prejudice resulting from the jury's inference of an
accused's criminal disposition from the fact of joint offenses is the prejudice a
defendant may suffer simply from the jury's inability to discriminate among
evidence limited to a particular offense. Defendants often assert on appeal that,
when two or more offenses are joined for a single trial, the jury is likely to cumulate the evidence against the defendant and be more apt to find guilt than if
each offense were tried individually. But, according to the Eighth Circuit Court
of Appeals in Jahnson v. United States,"1 "[w]eighing the danger of confusion
and undue cumulative inference is a matter for the trial judge within his sound
discretion. His denial of severance is not grounds for reversal unless clear prejudice and abuse of discretion are shown."
In some cases, this approach has been the basis for judicial relief. In United
States v. Carter,"' for example, the appellate court found that the trial court
clearly abused its discretion by failing to order a severance when defendant was
jointly tried for three separate assaults and robberies. In concluding that the jury
must have viewed the evidence cumulatively, the court explained,

". ..

as a

practical matter the jury must have been influenced by the sum total of the
evidence, without segregating, in insulated compartments, the proof under each
group of counts."2 '
In support of a contention that the jury improperly cumulated evidence of
multiple offenses, it is imperative that defendant show a "clear likelihood of confusion on the part of the jury. .. ."'o Moreover, "[a] severance is not available
to defeat an otherwise proper joinder... merely to diffuse the probative impact
of evidence of one's own guilt."2 ' In determining whether or not a jury may
have cumulated evidence of separate offenses, a court will look at the evidence in
question. If the evidence as to each crime is simple and distinct, most courts will
say there was little danger that the jury was unable to limit its consideration of
the evidence to the appropriate offense. 0 Finally, if a jury splits its decisions on
the various counts involved (for example, finding guilt on one count, and
201 356 F.2d 680, 682 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 857 (1966) (emphasis added);
See also United States v. Rajewski, 526 F.2d 149, 155 (7th Cir. 1976).
202 475 F.2d 349 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
203 Id. at 351. In Carter, the court's discussion points to the conclusion that the offenses
were misjoined under Rule 8(a). Nevertheless, the court fails to make any mention of Rule
8(a) and grounds its decision solely upon the finding of Rule 14 prejudice. This may be
because of the District of Columbia's conclusion that misjoinder of offenses under Rule 8(a)
isnot inherently prejudicial and, unless the defendant can show actual substantial prejudice,
the trial court's denial of severance will not be reversed. See Baker v. United States, 401
F.2d 958 (1968).
204 United States v. McGruder, 514 F.2d 1288, 1290 (5th Cir. 1975) '(emphasis added).
205 Id.
206 See, e.g., United States v. Lewis, 547 F.2d 1030, 1033 (8th Cir. 1976).
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acquitting or failing to reach a verdict on another), an inference will likely be
drawn by the courts that the jury was able to discriminate between the evidence
offered on each separate count, and that therefore the defendant was not
prejudiced.
B. Application of Rule 14 to Joined Defendants
1. Illness
One of the most cogent reasons for obtaining a severance of defendants is
that the moving party is 11."7 Since, if sincerely made, a defendant's motion
based on illness is not likely to be denied, there exist few cases where the issue is
discussed on appeal.
In cases such as this, a defendant may be required to show that a continuance will be insufficient. He may also be required to submit to a court-ordered
physical examination. Moreover, courts are not likely to grant a severance on
such grounds unless the defendant establishes to the court's satisfaction that a
severance is in fact necessitated by the illness.
The problems associated with this argument are illustrated in United States
v. Shotwell Mfg. Co.2"' In that case, even though the defendant's renewed
motion was accompanied by the supporting affidavits of two physicians attesting
to his poor health, the Seventh Circuit found that the district court did not abuse
its discretion in denying defendant's motion for a severance. In Shotwell, appellant, Cain, an officer of Shotwell Mfg. Co., was afflicted with a heart condition. Following a six-month postponement in the proceedings, a court-appointed
physician expressed the opinion that Cain could tolerate four to five hours per
day of trial. When defendant renewed his motion for severance, contending he
was not yet well enough for trial, it was denied. On appeal, the court found
that, because of the conflict in the medical testimony, there was no abuse of
discretion.
Whether or not a court will grant a severance to a defendant on the basis
of his attorney's illness is often far from clear. In most cases, a continuance will
probably be deemed to suffice. Even where the court ascertains that the illness
was "bona fide and unforeseeable," 2 °9 unless the accused can show additional
potential for prejudice, it is unlikely that the court will recognize his "special
interest in representation by experienced counsel of his own choice in whom he
can have the kind of confidence that grows from long-standing acquaintance. .. ,2 0 Otherwise, the court will look to the ability of replacement counsel

to take over the trial.
2. Guilt by Association
Courts are cognizant that in some instances the evidence as to one de207 See, e.g., United States v. Bastone, 526 F.2d 971, 975 n.1 (7th Cir. 1975) (where one
defendant was severed before trial due to illness) ; United States v. Joyce, 499 F.2d 9, 21 (7th
Cir. 1974) (where the court commented that, had appellant requested a severance or continuance, his hospitalization would almost certainly have justified it).
208 287 F.2d 667, 672 (7th Cir. 1961), aff'd on other grounds, 371 U.S. 341 (1963).
209 United States v. Mardian, 546 F.2d 973, 980 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
210 Id.
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fendant may be so overwhelming that a relatively minor actor may be found
guilty as a result of his connection with the more blameworthy.21 ' In Kotteakos
v. United States,"' the United States Supreme Court acknowledged the dangers
of transference of guilt in conspiracy trials. In a few situations, the possibility that
guilt will be transferred to a less culpable defendant may be so manifest that even
"[p]roper rulings on the admissibility of evidence and lucid limiting instructions
to the jury cannot entirely eliminate the danger of prejudice. .... ,
The fact that some element of prejudice might arise in this context is not
necessarily grounds for judicial relief. For example, in Woodcock v. Amaral,"4
the First Circuit, recognizing the potential for such prejudice, nevertheless found
that the prejudice had been reduced to acceptable proportions. But even when
the prejudice resulting from the element of transferred guilt does reach unacceptable proportions, reversal is still not compelled. Although the appellate
court may conclude that a separate trial should have been granted, when that
error "affects no substantial rights of the defendant,"" 5 the harmless error
doctrine will be held applicable. Thus, in United States v. Ong,"6 when the
court concluded that a jury would have rendered an identical verdict in a
separate trial, no reversal was deemed necessary.
In some cases, introduction of evidence in a joint trial, although limited to
a single defendant, may be so devastating as to impassion and prejudice the jury
against the co-defendants. In United States v. Haupt,"' for example, in a trial
for treason alleging that three defendants gave aid and comfort to the enemy
during World War II, evidence was adduced against Haupt to the effect that
he never renounced allegiance to his native country, and never acquired or
had any loyalty for this country where he became a naturalized citizen. A
situation is dramatically portrayed that is so revolting in its nature as to earn
for him the utmost contempt of every loyal citizen. The sordid and disloyal
utterances and activities of this defendant as proved could not have done
otherwise than deeply stir the passions and emotions of a jury. We are not
interested so much with the effect which this contemptuous background had
upon his case, but we are concerned with the effect [it] had upon other
defendants who were tried with him. z" 8
The Haupt court was quite obviously taking into consideration the temperament
of the times. Still, the reasoning employed in Haupt has continuing vitality today
in cases where one defendant may appear especially vile or reprehensible to the
jury with the effect that the jury may, either consciously or unconsciously, transfer
its distaste for that defendant to any person alleged to have been associated with
him or her.
211 See, e.g., Woodcock v. Amaral, 511 F.2d 985 (1st Cir. 1974); United States v. Mardian,
546 F.2d 973, 977 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (explaining that "(p)articularly where there is a great
disparity in the weight of the evidence, strongly establishing the guilt of some defendants, the
danger persists that that guilt will improperly 'rub off' on the others.").
212 328 U.S. 750, 774 (1946).
213 Woodcock v. Amaral, 511 F.2d 985, 994 (1st Cir. 1974).
214 511 F.2d 985.
215 United States v. Ong, 541 F.2d 331, 338 (2d Cir. 1976).
216 541 F.2d 331.
217 136 F.2d 661 (7th Cir. 1943).
218 Id. at 673.
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Courts are more prone to find prejudicial joinder the greater the possibility
of jury confusion. When, for instance, an indictment named twelve defendants in
eighty-four counts, the Second Circuit in United States v. Branker explained that
"as the number of counts is increased, the record becomes more complex and it
is more difficult for a juror to keep the various charges against the several, defendants and the testimony as to each of them separate in his mind."" The
Branker court observed that
[t]his kind of prejudice is particularly injurious to defendants who are
charged in only a few of the many counts, who are involved in only a small
proportion of the evidence, and who are linked with only one or two of
their co-defendants. The jury is subjected to weeks of trial dealing with
dozens of incidents of criminal misconduct which do not involve these
defendants in any way. As trial days go by, "the mounting proof of the guilt
of one is likely to affect another." Schaffer v. United States, 362 U.S. 511,
523, 80 S. Ct. 945, 952 (1960) (Douglas, J. dissenting) .220
One of ihe more politically prominent cases involving the concept of guilt
through association is United States v. Mardian,'2 ' where Watergate defendant
Mardian appealed the denial of his motion requesting a trial separate from codefendants Erlichman, Haldeman and Mitchell. Mardian, charged only with
conspiracy, relied on the doctrine enunciated by the Second Circuit in United
States v. Kelly,22 requiring severance when the evidence against one defendant
"is 'far more damaging' than the evidence against the moving party." 22 Yet,
the Mardian court was unable to rule as a matter of law that the denial of
Mardian's pretrial motion for severance constituted an abuse of discretion. Despite
the fact that Mardian had made "a substantial pretrial showing of possible
prejudice requiring severance under the Kelly doctrine," Judge Skelly Wright
found it "not so compelling that it was clear Mardian's interest in a separate trial
outweighed [those] interests favoring joinder."224 Nevertheless, the court did
find that the trial court erred in failing to grant the motion when it was renewed.

-by

which time it had become clear to the trial court not only that Mardian's

role in the conspiracy ended more than nineteen months before the conspiracy

itself dissipated, but that a substantial part of the testimony would focus on events
after Mardian ceased active participation.2 2'
3. Antagonistic Defenses

Oftentimes, joined defendants may not see eye-to-eye on particular aspects
of the trial. Yet, occasions are rare in which reviewing courts find that the
219 395 F.2d 881, 887-88 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1029 (1969).
220 Id. at 888.
221 546 F.2d 973 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
222 349 F.2d 720 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 947 (1966).
223 546 F.2d at 977.
224 Id. at 979.
225 Id. at 978. It is incumbent to note that, in reaching its decision to overturn Mardian's
conviction, the court also considered Mardian's interest in being represented by his own chosen
counsel, who was unable to attend trial because of illness.
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particular antagonism which exists among multiple defendants is so great as to
go to the very essence of a fair trial and require severance under Rule 14.
Although it is unlikely that a defendant will succeed when relying on antagonistic positions to support a Rule 14 motion, defense counsel should be
familiar with the five recurring situations in which the issue is likely to arise:
(a) where one defendant's courtroom demeanor is obstreperous or in some other
manner offensive; (b) where multiple defendants are represented by identical
counsel to their detriment; (c) where defendants are divided on the issue of trial
strategy; (d) where one defendant incriminates another at trial; and (e) where
one defendant is precluded from commenting on his/her co-defendant's silence
because of the fifth amendment. The foregoing presents a broad overview of
each of the situations in which co-defendants may find their interests conflicting,
and the courts' response to these claims of prejudice.
The prevailing standard in regard to the issue of antagonistic defendants has
been articulated by the District of Columbia Court of Appeals and is indicative
of the rule elsewhere." 6 They demand that

[uin order to demonstrate abuse of discretion by a trial judge, one must show
more than the fact that co-defendants whose strategies were generally antagonistic were tried together.... At the very least, it must be demonstrated

that a conflict is so prejudicial that differences are irreconcilable, and "that
the jury will unjustifiably
infer that this conflict alone demonstrates that
227
both are guilty."

Practical experience has confirmed that appellate courts look with equal disfavor
upon this claim of prejudice as any other. Courts are not inclined to find the
standard easily achieved.
a. Co-Defendant's Unruly Conduct at Trial
United States v. Caldwell"' presented a rather complex problem where two
joined defendants both appealed, alleging for different reasons that they should
have been tried apart from one another. Defendant Timm protested because a
physician called to testify in support of his insanity defense was precluded by
the judge from referring specifically to his co-defendant. But the D. C. Circuit
Court of Appeals found his argument specious since there was an insufficient
factual basis for the proffered testimony. The thrust of his co-defendant Caldwell's complaint was that Timm's outrageous behavior in the form of verbal
remarks directed to both the prosecutor and witnesses prejudiced the jury against
him. However, because he failed to specifically demonstrate how his defense was
damaged, the court could find no basis to conclude there was a carry-over
effect." 9
226

For example, it was cited favorably by the Seventh Circuit in United States v. George,

227

United States v. Robinson, 432 F.2d 1348, 1351 '(D.C. Cir. 1970); United States v.

477 F.2d 508, 515 (7th Cir. 1973).

Caldwell, 543 F.2d 1333, 1356 (D.C. Cir. 1975); United States v. Gorham, 523 F.2d
1088, 1092 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
228 543 F.2d 1333 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
229 Id. at 1360. See also United States v. Johnson, 426 F.2d 1112, 1116 (7th Cir.) cert.
denied, 400 U.S. 842 (1970), (Kiley, J.) (mem.) found without merit appellant's claim that
his co-defendant's aggravated conduct necessitated severance.
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b. Common Counsel
Another area in which assertions of antagonistic defenses frequently occur
are cases where co-defendants with conflicting interests are represented by the
same attorney. Whether or not an appellate court will conclude that severance
should have been granted appears to center on the question whether the common
counsel was appointed by the court to represent defendants or whether defendants
were represented of their own volition by privately retained counsel. Hence, in
United States v. Echeles,230 denial of defendant's motion for severance was
affirmed by the Seventh Circuit on the ground that both defendants chose to
proceed with common counsel after the trial judge advised them and their
lawyers prior to trial of the potential for a conflict of interest. On the other hand,
the same court held in United States v. Gougis.. that, where co-defendants'
interests were in conflict and some of the most damaging testimony against
Gougis came from his co-defendant who was represented by the same courtappointed attorney, "Gougis was thus denied his right to the effective assistance
of counsel guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment. This error alone requires that
the verdict be set aside ....
c. Conflicting Strategies
Additionally, conflict may arise in a joint trial when all defendants are
unable to agree on common strategy or procedure. However, the case law is not
very supportive of joined, but antagonistic, defendants faced with such conflict.
For example, in United States v. Joyce,3 3 some defendants demanded a jury
trial, while their co-defendants preferred a bench trial. When faced with that
dilemma, the Seventh Circuit held simply that severance was not required, since
"[t]here is no right to a bench trial . . . and avoidance of duplicate two week
trials is certainly a legitimate reason for withholding consent to the proffered
234
jury waiver."
In United States v. Williams,235 conflict arose when one defendant requested
a general instruction to the jury that no inference should be drawn from either
defendant's failure to testify. His co-defendant's counsel, afraid that the general
instruction would rather work to emphasize the fact that they refused to testify,
objected. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia ruled that "a judge does not commit error by granting one defendant's
request for a general instruction over the objection of one or more co-defendants."2 3 Rather, the judge should read the "general instruction when requested by one defendant, regardless of the wishes of the co-defendant."2 7
230 222 F.2d 144, 151 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 828 (1955).
231 374 F.2d 758 (7th Cir. 1967).
232 Id. at 761.
233 499 F.2d 9 "(7th Cir. 1974).
234 Id. at 21.
235 521 F.2d 950 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
236 Id. at 955.
237 416 F.2d 607, 620-21 (7th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, sub nom. Sacks v. United States,
396 U.S. 1007 (1970), (citing Dauer v. United States, 189 F.2d 343, 344 (10th Cir.), cert.
denied, 342 U.S. 898 (1951)).
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d. Attempts to Transfer Culpability
Generally, attempts by co-defendants to transfer culpability to one another
have been deemed insufficient to require severance. As the Seventh Circuit
explained in United States v. Hutul,
[t]he mere fact that there is hostility between defendants or that one may
try to save himself at the expense of another is in itself alone not sufficient
grounds to require separate trials. It is only when the situation is such that
the exercise of common sense and sound judicial judgment should lead
as that term
one to conclude that one defendant cannot have a fair2 trial,
38
is understood in law, that a severance should be granted.
Thus, in- United States v. George,239 when one defendant tried to save himself at
his co-defendant's expense, by making him out to be a blackmailer, the antagonism was insufficient to require a severance. Likewise, in United States v.
Gorham,"' when the two appellants on trial for escape from jail moved 'for a
severance when their two co-defendants-women who were accused of assisting
the inmates in their abortive escape attempt-presented testimony exculpatory to
them while at the same time inculpatory to appellants, the court, in denying their
motion, simply stated "[t]his antagonism cannot be equated with an irreconcilable conflict which by itself suggests guilt." 24 '
Another case in which an appellant claimed prejudice as a result of his codefendant's attempt to shift the blame to him was United States v. Di Giovanni. 42 There, because appellant's entire defense was that he was not involved
but rather the victim of a nefarious scheme to protect the true.culprit, the Second
Circuit found that his co-defendant's testimony did not prejudice his defense. In
United States v. Johnson,"' the Eighth Circuit concluded that defendants' positions were not inconsistent, since one defendant's testimony did not implicate the
other.244 But, meanwhile, in United States v. Joyce,24 when one defendant took
the stand and placed the blame on his co-defendant for the mail fraud scheme for
which the two were on trial, the Seventh Circuit simply remarked that this
was an insufficient reason to require a separate trial.246
The Fifth Circuit found abuse of discretion in this area in United States u.
Johnson,"' when the trial court had been apprised that appellant's co-defendant
had made a confession directly incriminating him and that appellant's defense
would be completely at odds with that of his co-defendant. Johnson's defense was
that he was not present when the crime in question, the passing of counterfeit
238 477 F.2d 508, 515 (7th Cir. 1973).
239 523 F.2d 1088 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
240 Id. at 1092.
241 544 F.2d 642, 644 (2d Cir. 1976).
242 540 F.2d 954, 959 (8th Cir. 1976).
243 See also United States v. Johnston, 547 F.2d 282, 285 (5th Cir. 1977).
244 499 F.2d 9 (7th Cir. 1974).
245 Id. at 21.
246 478 F.2d 1129 (5th Cir. 1973).
247 Id. at 1132. It is important to note that this case did not involve a Bruton-type problem,
since Johnson's co-defendant took the stand and was subjected to cross-examination concerning his out-of-court confession. See text accompanying notes 298-320 infra.
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money, was committed. In contrast, his co-defendant admitted participation but
denied having the requisite mens rea because he was an informant for a police
detective and had passed the money to appellant as part of what he thought was
a trap. In ruling that the trial court erred in denying appellant's motion for
severance, the court laid particular stress on the manner in which appellant had
presented his motion. The motion, made before trial, contended that appellant
could not obtain a fair trial unless severance were granted and explicitly pointed
out how the defenses were antagonistic. In addition, Johnson's counsel attached
to the motion a copy of the co-defendant's confession incriminating his client.248
Thus, it appears that pointing out specific areas of conflict to the district court is
a virtual necessity if one hopes to gain relief on the basis of such arguments.
It appears that the "hostile defendant" situation only compels severance
when defendants' defenses are "mutually exclusive [where] if one defendant
' Illustrative of such antagonistic defenses
were believed, the other could not be."249
are cases where one defendant admits participation in the crime but interposes an
affirmative defense, as entrapment, insanity, mistake, or duress, and incriminates
his co-defendant who denies participation altogether. In such a situation, a court
will be more inclined to order severance. In contrast, appellate courts are much
less prone to find that a trial judge abused his discretion simply because one
defendant attempts to shift the entire guilt in an effort to extricate himself.
e. Comment by a Co-Defendant on Defendant's Failure to Testify
Often occurring in conjunction with the hostile defendant situation is the
objection that appellant's fifth or sixth amendment rights were violated. This
claim can arise from one of two events. First, when a co-defendant or his
attorney comments on the fact that appellant failed to testify in his own behalf,
appellant can argue that he was penalized for exerting his fifth amendment
privilege not to incriminate himself. Secondly, in the converse situation, where
appellant did take the stand but his co-defendant did not, appellant may have
wished to comment on his co-defendant's silence as an inference of guilt but was
precluded from doing so. On appeal, he may argue that he was deprived of his
sixth amendment right of confrontation.
In the first situation, defendant's fifth amendment interest is clear and
deserves protection. The most prominent case concerning this issue is DeLuna v.
United States 2 There, despite the fact that curative instructions had been given
to the jury, the Fifth Circuit, speaking through Judge Wisdom, and relying on
principles later adopted by the Supreme Court in Griffin v. California,2 5' held
that
[In a criminal trial in a federal court an accused has a constitutionally
guaranteed right of silence free from prejudicial comments, even when they
248 United States v. Kahn, 381 F.2d 824, 841 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 1015
(1967).
249 308 F.2d 140 (5th Cir. 1962).
250 380 U.S. 609 (1965).
251 308 F.2d at 141. For a detailed discussion of the fifth amendment right to silence and its
origin, see id. at 144-51.
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come only from a co-defendant's attorney. If an attorney's duty to his client
should require him to draw the jury's attention to the possible inference of
guilt from a co-defendant's silence, the trial judge's duty is to order that the
defendants be tried separately.252
However, subsequent cases, while affirming DeLuna's premise, have failed to find
it apposite to the set of facts presented. The Seventh Circuit, for example, when

presented with a similar claim in United States v. Barney,25

distinguished

DeLuna.
In Barney, the co-defendant's counsel had twice attempted to call Barney to
the stand, but Barney had declined. In his closing argument, co-defendant's
counsel made the following comment to the jury:
My man took the stand. My man told you what happened. He didn't have
to do it. But he did ....
I submit to you that you don't have to deliberate
long on this case as to [my client]. And I don't know about Mr. Barney.
Mr. Barney could be guilty of everything in the world and I care less.254

In rejecting Barney's claim of prejudice, Judge Swygert explained that, unlike
the defendants in DeLuna, the defendants in Barney were not antagonistic, as
their position was that they had been strangers prior to trial. Moreover, he noted
that the comments regarding Barney's failure to take the stand were innocuous
and "not of such character that the jury would naturally infer them to have been
directed against his silence." 25 The judge additionally remarked that:
In several cases such as this, where no direct comments on a defendant's
silence like those in DeLuna or in Stewart v. United States, 366 U.S. 1, 81
S. Ct. 941, 6 L. Ed. 2d 84 (1961), were made, where the actions of
counsel . . . no more than incidentally "pointed up" a defendant's silence,
no violation of constitutional rights were found ....
Nor do we think that
the attempts to call the defendant to the stand add anything to the comments relied upon. They were not in themselves direct comments upon the
defendant's failure to testify. They did no more than momentarily illuminate
the obvious fact that the defendant did not choose to testify, and could have
had no greater impact upon the jury than the direct statement by the defendant's counsel immediately thereafter that "The defendant does not take
the stand .... He will stand mute."22 6
Furthermore, the court opined that cautionary instructions telling the jury not
to draw any inference against the defendant because he failed to testify would

sufficiently dissipate any prejudice defendant might otherwise have suffered.
Five years later, the Seventh Circuit again took occasion in United States v.
Blue25 to distinguish DeLuna. In Blue, appellant's co-defendant's counsel had
commented that his client did not have to take the stand but had decided to do

so in order to tell the jury everything. Appellant argued that the remark im252
253
254

371 F.2d 166 (7th Cir. 1966).
Id. at 170.
Id. at 171.

255

Id.

256
257

440 F.2d 300, 302-03 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 836 (1971).
308 F.2d 140, 143 "(5th Cir. 1962).
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planted in the minds of the jury a negative inference as to his failure to testify in
his own behalf. The court, however, disagreed. In DeLuna, it explained,
DeLuna's co-defendant had directly incriminated him. In addition, counsel for
his co-defendant repeatedly contrasted his testifying client with the silent DeLuna,
whereas in Blue, the comments were neither so extensive nor pervasive.
The second objection in regard to an antagonistic co-defendant's silence
confers a claim that appellant's sixth amendment right to confrontation has been
infringed if he is precluded from commenting upon a co-defendant's silence.
This claim is a direct counterpart of the fifth amendment claim discussed above,
since the appellants have simply exchanged roles. When claiming violation of
fifth amendment rights, the appellant was the nontestifying defendant; while in
the latter claim, appellant is the defendant who chose to take the stand.
In support of a motion for severance because of inability to comment, defendants may rely upon dicta expressed in DeLuna to the effect that the testifying
defendant also may have a right to comment on a co-defendant's failure to
testify, and severance is required to preserve that right, so as not to simultaneously violate the co-defendant's right not to be compelled to testify. The right to
confrontation allows him to invoke every inference from his co-defendant's failure
to take the stand.25 However, it should be pointed out that this dictum was
severely criticized by then Judge Griffin Bell in his concurring opinion in DeLuna
on the ground that it would create an "intolerable procedural problem."25' 9 He
argued that, if a defendant possesses the right to comment on his co-defendant's
failure to testify,
a mistrial will be required at the instance of his co-defendant who did not
take the stand. In addition, severance in advance of trial may be required
where there is a representation to the court that one co-defendant does not
expect to take the stand while another or others do expect to testify, and
claim their right to comment upon the failure of the other to testify. This
would eliminate joint trials, or vest in a defendant the right to a mistrial
during final arguments, or in the alternative create built-in reversible error,
2 60
all in the discretion of the defendants. The law contemplates no such end.
In United States v. Kahn,2 6' the Seventh Circuit held in disrepute the dicta
espoused by the majority in DeLuna and instead adopted Judge Bell's rationale.
In Kahn, Judge Hastings explained that
we cannot say there is an absolute right, without reference to the circumstances of defense at trial, for a defendant to comment on the refusal of a
co-defendant to testify. We think there must be more to justify the disintegration of a trial. . . .There must be a showing
262 that real prejudice will
result from the defendant's inability to comment.
258 Id. at 156.
259 Id.
260 381 F.2d 824- (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 1015 (1967).
261 Id. at 840. Accord Kolod v. United States, 371 F.2d 983, 991-92 (10th Cir. 1967),
where the court found that appellant could not possibly have benefitted from commenting to
the jury in regard to his co-defendant's silence, since defendants were not antagonistic in that
no defendant had attempted to transfer all of the blame to another.
262 See Note, Joinder of Defendants in Criminal Prosecutions, 42 N.Y.U.L. REV. 513, 526
(1967).
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Thus, although the Seventh Circuit has not completely closed the door to the
possibility that a defendant may be prejudiced by the inability to comment on
his co-defendant's silence, it is far from clear what the court will demand as an
adequate showing of prejudice or whether the court will ever in fact recognize
a defendant's right to comment in a case before it. Certain, however, is that a
defendant must, at the very minimum, establish that defendants' positions are
extraordinarily antagonistic-that their defenses are mutually exclusive and that
each defendant has no qualms about assisting in the conviction of his co-defendant in order to save himself. One commentator has suggested that the matter
be resolved at a pre-trial conference in chambers so that the judge could discover which defendants intend to testify and inquire whether such a degree of
antagonism exists among defendants as to give one defendant a legitimate interest
in commenting on his co-defendant's silence.26
4. Severance to Compel Co-Defendant's Exculpatory Testimony
The fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination prohibits a defendant from even being called to the witness stand. 4 Consequently, a defendant may be obstructed in presenting a defense when he desires to obtain
favorable testimony from his co-defendant but is foreclosed from doing so when
the co-defendant fails to take the stand. Yet, a court is under no automatic
duty to sever merely because potentially exculpatory testimony of a co-defendant
exists.26 In order to outweigh the government's compelling goals of judicial
efficiency and economy which justify joint trails, appellant must establish that
he was deprived of a fundamentally fair trial because he was unable to make use
of his co-defendant's testimony at trial. And "what constitutes abuse of discretion in terms of protecting each defendant's rights in such cases necessarily is
determined by the facts in each specific case. 266
United States v. Echeles6 7 has been adopted as a standard for comparison
by numerous courts in determining whether or not appellant was so prejudiced
as to infringe upon due process protections. In Echeles, an attorney and his client
were on trial jointly for having knowingly procured a witness to testify falsely at
this client's narcotics trial. The client, after admitting in open court during his
narcotics trial his part in the scheme, on three separate occasions denied Echeles'
participation. At the subsequent joint perjury trial, Echeles moved for a
severance on the ground that in a joint trial he would be unable to call, his codefendant to testify to the exculpatory statements. The government countered
Echeles' argument by pointing out that, even if the trial were severed, there was
no showing that Echeles' co-defendant would waive his fifth amendment rights if
tried first. The Seventh Circuit declared, however, that the trial court could
263 United States v. Echeles, 352 F.2d 892, 897 (7th Cir. 1965).
264 Byrd v. Wainwright, 428 F.2d 1017, 1020 (5th Cir. 1970). See also United States v.
Kahn, 381 F.2d at 841.
265 352 F.2d at 897.
266 352 F.2d 892.
267 Id. at 898. See also Byrd v. Wainwright, 428 F.2d 1017, 1022 (5th Cir. 1970) for the
proposition that the sequence of trials is in the discretion of the court.
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properly have directed that Echeles be tried last.2" 8 Moreover, it remarked:
With regard to the question of whether or not Arrington would claim the
privilege if he were called as a witness during a trial of Echeles alone-a
trial held subsequent to his own-we can 2only
say that such question was
69
not properly the government's to interpose.
The court added:
Speculation about what Arrington might do at a later Echeles trial undoubtedly would be a matter of some concern to Echeles, but he should not
be foreclosed of the possibility that Arrington would
270 testify in his behalf
merely because that eventuality was not a certainty.
In holding that it was error to deny Echeles' severance motion, the court stated
that "a fair trial for Echeles necessitated providing him the opportunity of getting
the Arrington evidence before the jury, regardless of ho'w we might regard the

credibility of that witness or the weight of his testimony." 71
It is incumbent to point out that in Echeles the credibility of the witness'
testimony was not at issue. Rather, because the co-defendant's exculpatory statements were declarations contrary to his own penal interest, they bore an exceptionally high indicia of reliability. And subsequent courts have found it quite
appropriate for the court to inquire into the weight of the testimony as well as
the witness' credibility. For example, in United States v. Abraham,272 the
Seventh Circuit, after examining the proposed exculpatory testimony, determined
that it merely contradicted certain elements of the government's proof. "Unlike
in Echeles, the testimony would not amount to a dramatic and convincing exculpation of the co-defendants.""2 7 Similarly, the Fifth Circuit charged that:
"Credibility is for the jury, but the judge is not required to sever on patent
fabrications. If the testimony is purely cumulative, or of negligible weight or
probative value, the court is not required to sever."2 74
Moreover, subsequent courts have put great weight on the fact that the
exculpatory testimony at issue had already been elicited as a declaration against
penal interest. In Byrd v. Wainwright,275 the court was impressed that confessions
exculpatory of appellant made by his six co-defendants were all contrary to their
penal interests. And in United States v. Alejandro,27 the court, in rejecting appellant's claim, noted that the exculpatory material was not contrary to his co268 352 F.2d at 898. This phrase has been rejected by the Fifth Circuit in Byrd v. Wainwright, 428 F.2d 1017, 1022 (5th Cir. 1970), on the ground that the government is entitled to
protest defendant's need for a severance. The Byrd view is probably the more accepted vieweven in the Seventh Circuit. Byrd has been cited favorably by the Seventh Circuit in United
States v. Isaacs, 493 F.2d 1124, 1161 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 976 '(1974).
269 352 F.2d at 898.
270 Id. (emphasis added).
271. 541 F.2d 1234 (7th Cir. 1976).
272 Id. at 1240 (emphasis added).
273 428 F.2d 1017, 1021. See also United States v. Bridgeman, 523 F.2d 1099, 1108 (D.C.
Cir. 1975), where the court found that with or without the proposed 'exculpatory testimony,
there was ample evidence to convict defendants.
274 428 F.2d 1017, 1021-22.
275 527 F.2d 423, 428.
276 Id. at 428.
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defendant's penal interest, citing Echeles as authority. In Alejandro, the court
pointed out that, because the co-defendant had been caught "red-handed" with
the heroin, "[h]is effort to absolve his co-defendant cost him nothing. It is not
unusual under such circumstances for the obviously guilty defendant to try to
assume the entire guilt. Denying Alejandro the opportunity to get that kind of
testimony from [his27'co-defendant] was not ... depriving Alejandro of a fundamentally fair trial."
The Fifth Circuit in Byrd v.Wainwright" 8 expanded the basic guidelines set
forth in Echeles into a five-part analysis to aid courts in their determination as to
when a separate trial is mandated. Those criteria, to be used as general areas of
inquiry, are set out below:
First, "[d]oes the movant intend or desire to have the co-defendant testify?
How must his intent be made known to the court, and to what extent must the
court be satisfied that it is bona fide?"' 9 In discussing this guideline, the Byrd
court explained that it is not essential that defendant's attorney submit formal
testimony under oath or a sworn affidavit in regard to his intent to use the codefendant's testimony. Instead, the matter may be presented orally during a
conference, or as in Byrd, at the pre-trial suppression hearing.
Secondly,
[w]ill the projected testimony of the co-defendant be exculpatory in nature,
and how significant must the effect be? How does the defendant show the
nature of the projected testimony and its significance? Must he in some way
validate the proposed testimony so as to give it some stamp of verity?2a0
The requirement that the proposed testimony be exculpatory, implicit in Echeles,
is sometimes overlooked by defendants because of its apparent simplicity. But in
United States v.Diez,"8' because co-defendant's proffered testimony was deemed
conclusive and lacking in sufficient detail, the court found it bereft of exculpatory
content. Likewise, in United States v. Bridgeman 8 2 when the tendered testimony merely asserted that appellants did not participate in planning a prison
break or subsequent riot, the court explained that when defendants are charged
with conspiracy, they may be held responsible for acts done in furtherance of the
conspiracy before or after their actual participation. Hence, testimony to the
effect that defendants were not involved in one phase of the conspiracy would not
have been exculpatory. Finally, in United States v. Cochran," 3 the court explained that, when the object of the proposed testimony is to impeach the credibility of a government witness, the testimony is not exculpatory in nature. Thus,
appellant had no right to a separate trial.
Thirdly, the Fifth Circuit says a court should consider "[t]o what extent,
277 428 F.2d 1017.
278 Id. at 1019.
279 Id. at 1020. For an illustration of the procedure which may be followed by the trial
court, see United States v. Gleason, 259 F. Supp. 282 (S.D.N.Y. 1966), cited favorably by the
Byrd court.
280 515 F.2d 892, 902-03 (5th Cir. 1975).
281 523 F.2d 1099, 1108 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
282 499 F.2d 380, 391 (5th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1124'(1975).
283 428 F.2d at 1020.
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and in what manner, must it be shown that if severance is granted there is a likelihood that the co-defendant will testify?"28 4 This standard of likelihood was initially set out in Echeles and interpreted by subsequent courts as imposing a
burden upon the defendant to demonstrate that the co-defendant would more
likely than not testify at a separate trial. Ensuing cases have not been prone to
find the burden satisfied. In Alejandro, for instance, the appellant failed to
establish that the co-defendant would be willing to testify at a separate trial. In
United States v. Kahn,28 Judge Hastings added that "[t]he unsupported possibility that such testimony might be forthcoming does not make the denial of a
motion for severance erroneous." Therefore, it is imperative that a defendant
demonstrate that his/her co-defendant is willing to offer testimony to his/her
benefit. In United States v. Isaacs, 28 1 appellant's claim of prejudice was rejected
when his counsel had simply made an oral statement to the court that appellant's
co-defendant would render exculpatory testimony. The court explained that
severance was not required "where the possibility of the co-defendant's testifying
is merely colorable or there is no showing that it is anything more than a gleam
'
of possibility in the defendant's eye."287
288
In United States v. Johnson, appellant's counsel had merely claimed, to
no avail, that the co-defendant's testimony could have explained his client's
presence at the scene of the attempted robbery, but failed to establish that the codefendant was actually willing to so testify. A similar ruling is found in Kolod v.
United States.289 There, the co-defendant had submitted an affidavit stating that
he was willing to testify and describing the nature of his testimony, but adding
that after rendering the exculpatory testimony, he would be compelled to assert
the fifth amendment as to his own case, thus impairing his defense in the eyes of
the jury. On appeal, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the trial court's denial of severance on the ground that the appellant did not establish that the witness would be
more willing to waive his fifth amendment privilege if separate trials were
granted, and it was not up to the court to so speculate."' And in Braasch v.
United States,2 9 appellant claimed his co-defendant's testimony could have
exonerated him. However, during in-chambers questioning by the trial judge,
the co-defendant refused to answer any questions, including whether he would
testify for Braasch in a separate trial if one were granted. Thus, appellant failed
to meet his burden.
In addition to the aforementioned requirements, the co-defendant's offer to
testify must not be made conditional upon some event. For example, in United
States v. Cochran,292 when the witness agreed to testify only if the charges against

284
285
286

381 F.2d 824, 841 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 1015 (1967).
493 F.2d 1124, 1160 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 976 (1974).
Id. at 1161 '(quoting Byrd v. Wainwright, 428 F.2d at 1022).

287 426 F.2d 1112, 1116 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 842 (1970).
288

289
where
waive
290
291
292

371 F.2d 983 (10th Cir. 1967).

Id. at 991. See also Woodcock v. Amaral, 511 F.2d 985, 994, n.18 (1st Cir. 1974),
appellant offered no indication that his co-defendant would have been more willing to
his fifth amendment right in a separate trial.
505 F.2d 139, 150 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 910 (1975).
499 F.2d 380, 392-93 (5th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1124 (1975).
515 F.2d 892 (5th Cir. 1975).
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him were dismissed, the appellate court found the severance motion properly
denied.
Finally, some courts are not even satisfied if there exists a non-conditional,
likelihood that the co-defendant will testify. In United States v. Diez,"3 the
Fifth Circuit, relying on its own criteria as enunciated in Byrd increased defendant's burden by adding that "[t]he movant must show a substantial likeli'
Such an
hood that the co-defendant will testify if the severance is granted."294
increased burden of proof will not affect*cases like Byrd, where it was certain that
the exculpatory evidence would have been introduced at a separate trial. However, in most cases, defendants find it difficult even to meet the simple likelihood
test.
The fourth criterion the court should weigh, according to the Fifth Circuit,
is "the demands of effective judicial administration and economy of judicial
effort. Related
to this is the matter of timeliness in raising the question of
295
severance."
Finally, the Byrd court took into account the question of "how great is the
probability that a co-defendant will plead guilty at or immediately before trial
and thereby prejudice the defendant, either by cross-defendant prejudice or by
surprise as it relates to trial preparation. 296
Even after considering the guidelines set forth in Byrd, it is nevertheless unlikely that an appellate court will find that a trial court abused its discretion in
failing to grant a severance. In the two leading cases in which abuse of discretion was determined, the facts were extraordinary, and prejudice was obvious.
In Echeles, appellant's co-defendant had completely exonerated him three times
previously in open court. The prejudice which inhered to the appellant was even
more egregious in Byrd v. Wainwright.97

Byrd was one of seven defendants indicted for the rape of a young woman.
All six of his co-defendants had confessed their part in the crime. Four of the
confessions failed to mention Byrd and the fifth explicitly exonerated Byrd.
Although the sixth confession implicated Byrd as being present during the rape,
the confessor later admitted to Byrd's counsel that he had been confused and
mistaken, since Byrd clearly was not involved. Byrd was the only defendant who
did not confess. Moreover, he was the only defendant to take the stand in his
own behalf at trial. Because Byrd was jointly tried with his six co-defendants, he
was precluded from introducing the six confessions into evidence, since each was
Miranda-defective. The appellate court pointed out that, in a separate trial,
even if his co-defendants refused to testify in Byrd's behalf, Byrd could certainly
take advantage of the exculpatory content of the confessions, since they would not

293 Id. at 903 (emphasis added).
294 428 F.2d at 1020. See, e.g., United States v. Diez, 515 F.2d 892, 903 (5th Cir. 1975),
where defendant's motion for severance three weeks into trial with no explanation for the delay
was deemed untimely.
295 428 F.2d at 1020.
296 428 F.2d 1017.
297 Because Byrd involved the review of a habeas corpus petition, the appellate court looked
to state evidence law regarding hearsay. Under the federal rules, however, declarations against
penal interests are defined as non-hearsay and are equally admissible.
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be used for incrimination purposes at Byrd's individual trial and since they fit
within a hearsay exception.298
In sum, unless an appellant can demonstrate an inordinate degree of prejudice resulting from an inability to utilize a co-defendant's exculpatory testimony
because of the co-defendant's exercise of his fifth amendment right to remain
silent at a joint trial, plus establish that the co-defendant will be more willing to
waive that privilege at a separate trial (or that the testimony would be admissible
at a separate trial), the court is under no duty to sever the defendants.
5. Severance to Exclude Co-Defendant's Out-of-Court Inculpatory Statements
The antithesis of defendant's request for severance so that he may obtain
exculpatory evidence from a co-defendant is the situation where a defendant
desires a severance so as to exclude inculpatory testimony based on an extrajudicial confession of a co-defendant. Bruton v. United States299 is the landmark
case in this area. Bruton is concerned with the prejudicial impact on a defendant,
when an out-of-court confession incriminatory as to both defendants is made by
a co-defendant and related in court bya third-party witness. The constitutional
infirmity in these cases arises from defendant's inability to cross-examine the
declarant (the confessing co-defendant), when he invokes his fifth amendment
right to refuse to take the stand. -As a result, defendant is deprived of his sixth
amendment right to confront his accusers. The mere fact that a defendant has
the opportunity to cross-examine the witness to whom the confession was made
is ineffective to bolster the innate unreliability of the hearsay statement.
In such instances, the confession is properly admissible against the confessing declarant under state and federal evidentiary law as an admission against
penal interest-an exception to the hearsay doctrine grounded in notions that
statements falling within certain delineated areas have a high indicia of reliability. However, it is patently inadmissible when considered as evidence regarding the non-confessing defendant; since, as to him, the statement does not
fit within one of the hearsay exceptions tending to make it reliable.
Prior to Bruton, courts simply instructed juries to limit the testimony to the
declarant/confessor and to ignore all implications as to the non-confessor. Not
until Bruton did courts recognize the impossibility of such a feat. In such circumstances, even the most precise limiting instructions are insufficient to undo the
prejudice a defendant suffers in the minds of the jurors.
The Seventh Circuit recognized this potential for prejudice in Simmons v.
United States,0 0 where an extrajudicial incriminatory statement of appellant's
co-defendant had been introduced as part of the government's case in chief. At
the close of the government's case, the co-defendant pleaded guilty, thereby
cutting off any opportunity of appellant to subject him to cross-examination.
The court held that it was incumbent on the government to produce the
declarant, and the fact that appellant could have subpoenaed him was irrelevant.
298 391 U.S. 123 (1968).
299 440 F.2d 890 (7th Cir. 1971).
300 Id. at 891. See also United States v. Cook, 530 F.2d 145, 149-51 "(7th Cir.), cert.
denied, 426 U.S. 909 (1976), finding admission of evidence in contravention of Bruton extremely prejudicial.
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In determining that appellant was prejudiced by the unavailability of the
declarant, the court relied on Bruton, stating that "the risk that the jury will not,
or cannot, follow [cautionary] instructions is so great, and the consequences of
failure so vital to the defendant, that the practical and human limitations of the
jury system cannot be ignored." ' '
However, a prerequisite for the applicability of Bruton is that the extrajudicial statements must, in fact, be inculpatory as to the non-confessing defendant. In United States v. Hicks,"2 four defendants were tried jointly and the
out-of-court confession of one of the defendants made a reference to dividing
the stolen money four ways. The court, concluding that a reference to the
number of persons involved in a bank robbery was not inculpatory- to the nonconfessing defendants, rejected their claims of prejudice which had been raised
pursuant to Rule 1403
When the potential for a Bruton-type dilemma exists, there are three options
available to the court and the prosecutor: 1) not to make use of the incriminating confession; 2) to order separate trials of the defendants; or 3) simply to
delete all references to the non-confessing defendant."0 4
The choice most frequently invoked is that of redaction, where the court
edits out of the confession all incriminating references to the joint defendant.
Authority for this practice is attributed to a footnote in Bruton V.United States,
validating the use of deletions as a method to simultaneously protect a nonconfessing defendant's sixth amendment right while furthering the government's
305
interest in trying defendants together. Thus, in United States v. English,
when an F.B.I. agent related a defendant's confession, stating that the confessing
defendant and "two other individuals" had committed the crimes, the court
found that the non-confessing defendants' sixth amendment rights remained
intact."'
The applicability of Bruton v. United States..7 was severely curtailed by
301 524 F.2d 1001 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 946; 425 U.S. 953 (1976).
302 Id. at 1002-03. See also United States v. Bastone, 526 F.2d 971, 983 (7th Cir. 1975);
United States v. Blassick, 422 F.2d 652, 655 (7th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 985
(1971); United States v. Johnson, 426 F.2d 1112, 1116 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 842
(1970). Cf. United States v. Kahn, 381 F.2d 824, 837 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 1015
(1967) (a guilty plea entered by one co-defendant after trial had commenced was not the
equivalent of an out-of-court confession within the meaning of Bruton).
303 See United States v. Truslow, 530 F.2d 257, 261-62 (4th Cir. 1975). It is important
to note, however, that if the government chooses not to sever, but agrees not to introduce
Bruton-defective evidence and thereafter breaks its promise, defendant's conviction will be
reversed. United States v. Taylor, 508 F.2d 761, 764-65 (5th Cir. 1975).
Also noteworthy is the fact that, if after trial commences against joint defendants, the
government obtains a severance and a mistrial to avoid Bruton problems, the double jeopardy
clause attaches. In United States v. Glover, 506 F.2d 291 (2d Cir. 1974), four days into the
trial, after it became clear that the case presented a Bruton dilemma, the court granted the
government's motion for severance and a mistrial. Glover's conviction on retrial was reversed
on the ground that he had twice been placed in jeopardy.
304 501 F.2d 1254 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, sub nom., Hubbard v. United States,
419 U.S. 1114 (1975).
305 Id. See also United States v. Fleming, 504 F.2d 1045, 1049 (7th Cir. 1974); United
States ex rel. Long v. Pate, 418 F.2d 1028, 1030 (7th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 952;
United States v. Gregg, 414 F.2d 943, 948-49 (7th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 399 U.S. 934
(1970); United States v. Dady, 536 F.2d 675, 677-78 *(6th Cir. 1976); (all relying on Bruton
as justification for the use of redaction).
306 391 U.S. 123 (1968).
307 400 U.S. 74 (1970).
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Dutton v. Evans."" In Dutton, a co-conspirator's out-of-court statement was
admitted in evidence against the defendant under the conspiracy exception to the
hearsay rule. The Supreme Court in Dutton distinguished Bruton and limited
it only to those cases where the extra-judicial incriminatory confession did not fit
within any exception to the hearsay rule as to the non-confessor. The Court
made clear in Dutton that "[t]he right of cross-examination ... is not absolute.
There is no violation of sixth amendment rights where the testimony is sufficiently
clothed with 'indicia' of reliability which have been widely viewed as determinative of whether a statement may be placed before the jury though there is no
confrontation with the declarant." 30 9
Since both state and federal evidence law exceptions to the hearsay doctrine
are codifications of the common law determinations as to which classifications
of evidence are reliable regardless of inability to cross-examine the declaranti
statements fitting within those exceptions pose no sixth amendment difficulties.
Consequently, in such cases, severance is never required.
The most common exception to the hearsay rule which is utilized to introduce out-of-court statements into evidence is the co-conspirator exception. Statements made by a conspirator in furtherance of the conspiracy are admissible as to
all conspirators regardless of whether or not the opportunity for cross-examination exists. 1 However, a limitation to the co-conspirator exception was articulated by the Supreme Court in Anderson v. United States.31
The doctrine that declarations of one conspirator may be used against
another conspirator, if the declaration was made during the course of and
in furtherance of the conspiracy charged, is a well recognized exception to
the hearsay rule which would otherwise bar the introduction of such outof-court declarations.... The hearsay-conspiracy exception applies only to
declarations made while the conspiracy charged was still in progress, a
limitation that this Court has "scrupulously observed."
As a result of that limitation, the Seventh Circuit reversed appellant's conviction
in United States v. Lyon.. 2 on the ground that the introduction of a co-defendant's post-conspiracy extrajudicial statements implicating Lyon violated Lyon's
sixth amendment right of confrontation, and that violation could not be cured
by limiting instructions to the jury.
Other exceptions to the hearsay rule are also deemed reliable and thus hearsay testimony fitting within those exceptions is admissible without an opportunity
for cross-examination of the declarant. For example, in McLaughlin v.
Vinzant,"' testimony of a co-defendant's spontaneous utterance that "George
308 United States v. Cogwell, 486 F.2d 823, 834 (7th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S.
959 (1974) (citing Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74, 89 (1970)).
309 See FaD. R. Evm. 801 (d)(2)(E) (1975).
As illustrative of the co-conspirator's exception to the hearsay rule, see Dutton v. Evans,
400 U.S. 74 (1970); United States v. Cogwell, 486 F.2d 823, 834-35 (7th Cir. 1973), cert.
denied, 416 U.S. 959 (1974); United States v. Jones, 438 F.2d 461, 466 (7th Cir. 1971);
United States v. Kelley, 526 F.2d 615, 620-21 (8th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 971
(1976); United States v. Swainson, 548 F.2d 657, 661 (6th Cir. 1977).
310 417 U.S. 211, 218 (1974), cited in United States v. Truslow, 530 F.2d 257, 260 (4th
Cir. 1975).
311 397 F.2d 505 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 846 (1968).
312 522 F.2d 448 (1st. Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1037 (1975).
313 402 U.S. 622 (1971).

NOTRE DAME LAWYER

[D)ecember 1977]

shot someone" was found admissible against George despite the fact that the
uttering co-defendant failed to take the stand.
Bruton was also distinguished by the Supreme Court in Nelson v. O'Neil.314
Since Bruton's rationale was based on infringement of the non-confessing defendant's right to confrontation, the Supreme Court reasoned in Nelson that if
an opportunity for cross-examination were available, defendant's constitutional
right would not be impinged. As a result, whenever the confessing co-defendant
takes the stand, whether he confirms or denies the out-of-court statement attributed to him, Bruton is inapplicable, and Nelson v. O'Neil controls. In such
a case, severance is not required, as the defendant's constitutional rights, according to the Court, are not in danger of being abrogated. Hence, in United States
v. Marine,"5 the Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of severance
on the ground that the declarant testified and was subjected to cross-examination
by appellant in regard to the out-of-court statements incriminating him.
However, there have been a few cases where an appellate court has found
that a trial court abused its discretion in failing to order severance, despite the
fact that the confessing co-defendant was available to be cross-examined. For
example, in Schaffer v. United States,"6 the Fifth Circuit reversed when
the two defendants were so inseparably connected that the jury could hardly
have been expected to return a verdict of guilty against one and of not
guilty as to the other. There being only two defendants, it Would not be
very time consuming but entirely practicable to accord them separate trials.
..."We doubt if itwas within the realm of possibility for this jury to limit
its consideration of the damaging effect of such statements merely to the
defendant against whom they were admitted."
Although Schaffer was decided prior to Nelson v. O'Neil which expressly condoned joint trials in which the confessing co-defendant was subject to crossexamination, Schaffer was reaffirmed in a post-Nelson case by the Fifth Circuit
in United States v. Johnson.'
Additionally, the Seventh Circuit found occasion to reverse a conviction,
even though the confessing co-defendant was available for cross-examination but
the appellant did not avail himself of the opportunity to do so. In United States
v. Guajardo-Melendez"5 the court was disturbed by the government's bad motive
in adducing the incriminating testimony, as well as the fact that other evidence
against appellant was insubstantial. Judge Swygert, concluding that defendant
was denied a fair trial by the admission of the hearsay testimony, explained that:

314 413 F.2d 214 (7th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1001 (1970).
315 See also United States v.Bastone, 526 F.2d 971 (7th Cir. 1975); United States ex
rel. Long v. Pate, 418 F.2d 1028 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 952 (1970).
316 221 F.2d 17, 19 (5th Cir. 1955) (quoting U.S. v.Haupt, 136 F.2d 661, 672 (1943)).
317 478 F.2d 1129 (5th Cir. 1973). In Johnson, the confessing co-defendant took the
stand and affirmed the out-of-court statement incriminating Johnson and was subjected to
cross-examination. However, it is incumbent to point out that reversal in Johnson was based
not only on the prejudice defendant suffered from his co-defendant's out-of-court testimony,
but additionally on their extreme antagonistic positions at trial.
318 401 F.2d 35 (7th Cir. 1968).
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[T]he record leads us to believe that the Assistant United States Attorney
should have known that the answer by Agent Azzam to his question could
serve only an improper purpose-eliciting evidence which incriminated
[appellant] but which was inadmissible against him. The district judge's
"warning" to the jury . ..was no warning at all, and his other cautionary
instructions lacked sufficient specificity to cure the prejudicial effect of the
testimony, even assuming, contrary
to Bruton, that the jury could have
319
followed more specific instructions.
Finally, even where Bruton has been clearly violated, the harmless error
doctrine has been held applicable when "[t]he testimony erronecusly admitted
was merely cumulative of other overwhelming and largely uncontroverted
evidence properly before the jury. 3 20
C. Prejudice Cured by Jurors' Discrimination
In some cases, even though an appellate court recognized the potential for
substantial prejudice, it nevertheless held that the defendant suffered no
prejudice. The rationale in such cases rests upon two grounds. First, if it finds
that the jury was carefully admonished as to the admissibility of evidence in
regard to each count or each defendant to whom it related, the appellate court
will presume that the jury was able to and did faithfully follow the instructions. 2'
Thus, careful limiting and cautionary instructions may prevent prejudice which
might otherwise occur.
There are, of course, limitations as to the ability of instructions to cure
prejudice. For example, in Bruton122 the Supreme Court found it beyond the
capacity of the jury to compartmentalize evidence regardless of the precision of
the instructions, in situations where an out-of-court confession by a co-defendant
incriminated appellant, yet denied him the opportunity to cross-examine the
declarant. However, subsequent courts have refused to extend limitations on the
3
jury's ability to follow instructions to related areas.
Secondly, if the jury convicted as to some counts or defendants, yet not as
to others, an appellate court may infer that the evidence did not have a cumulative effect on the jury324 and "that the jury carefully examined each count as to
each defendant and rendered its verdict accordingly."329 Thus, in United States
v. Braasch,20 the appellate court explained that "[t]he fact that the jury found
four of the defendants not guilty on [some] counts showed that they not only
knew what they were doing but did what they intended. 3 27
319 Id. at 39.
320 Brown v. United States, 411 U.S. 223, 231 (1973).
321 Brandom v. United States, 431 F.2d 1391, 1396 (7th Cir. 1970).
322 391 U.S. 123 (1968).
323 See, e.g., Woodcock v. Amaral, 511 F.2d 985, 995 (lst Cir. 1974).
324 United States v. Lewis, 547 F.2d 1030, 1033 (8th Cir. 1976).
325 United States v. Hutul, 416 F.2d 607, 620 (7th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, sub nom.,
Sacks v. United States, 396 U.S. 1007 (1970).
326 505 F.2d 139 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 910 (1975).
327 Id. at 150. See also United States v. Johnston, 547 F.2d 282 (5th Cir. 1977); Dunaway
v. United States, 205 F.2d 23 (D.C. Cir. 1953). But see Cross v. United States, 335 F.2d 987,
991 (D.C. Cir. 1964) (Dunaway distinguished).
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D. Rule 14 Waiver
The motion alleging prejudice under Rule 14 should be made at the first
opportunity after information in support of the motion comes to the attention of
the defendant. Frequently, that time will be prior to trial. Failure to make a
timely motion for severance pursuant to Rule 14 when the opportunity to do so
existed prior to trial might constitute waiver of the objection. Otherwise, the
motion should be made as soon as the possibility for prejudice appears.
The defendant in United States v. Larson, 28 for example, failed to raise his
objection to joinder until his motion for a new trial. The court stated that, as a
result, "the burden is on [defendant] to demonstrate actual prejudice resulting
from the failure to sever. . . .""' to require reversal of his conviction. On the
other hand, in United States v. Sanchez,33 appellant did not even raise the matter of prejudice until appeal. Yet, the Ninth Circuit, although agreeing that failure to object to joinder normally constitutes waiver, observed that "with a thin
case against him, we think appellant was deprived not only of his right to confrontation but of his basic right to a fair trial. This was a manifest injustice and
constitutes plain error under Rule 52(b), Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure." 33'
Appellant's objection in United States ex rel. Long v. Pate,"2 however, was
found untimely and thereby waived. Appellant claimed prejudice resulted
because of his co-defendant's statements incriminating him. But the court rejected his claim on appeal on the basis that he "did not move for a severance in
the trial court, despite the fact that he was informed prior to trial of the existence
of his [co-defendant's incriminating] statements."33' 3 Likewise, in United States v.
Diez,334 the Court of Appeals looked harshly upon defendant's belated motion
when he offered no explanation for the delay, pointing out that "[h]aving spent
three weeks of trial time hearing the testimony of over sixty witnesses and considering over three hundred documents, the trial judge was not obliged to treat
[defendant's] motion as he would an ordinary severance request made at the outset of trial."3"'
In addition, the objection must ordinarily be preserved for appeal through
renewal in the form of a motion for a new trial.336 Nevertheless, some courts will
328 526 F.2d 256 (5th Cir. 1976).
329 Id. at 259.
330 532 F.2d 155 (9th Cir. 1976).
331 Id. at 158.
332 418 F.2d 1028 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 952 (1970).
333 Id. at 1030. Furthermore, although Bruton was not controlling since in Pate, defendant
had the opportunity to cross-examine his confessing co-defendant, the court took pains to distinguish Bruton on the ground that in Bruton, a severance had been requested by defendant and
denied.
334 515 F.2d 892 (5th Cir. 1975).
335 Id. at 903. See also United States v. Caldwell, 543 F.2d 1333, 1358 (D.C. Cir. 1975)
(reh. denied 1976), where the court considered and rejected appellant's claim of prejudice
but empasized that the motion (made at midtrial) was untimely. Accord Kolod v. United
States, 371 F.2d 983 (10th Cir. 1967), in which case the court, although rejecting appellant's
claims on the merits, gave great weight to the fact that the motion for severance was untimely
filed.
336 United States v. Barney, 371 F.2d 166, 170 (7th Cir. 1966); United States v. Johnson,
540 F.2d 954, 959 (8th Cir. 1976); United States v. Lewis, 547 F.2d 1030 (8th Cir. 1976);
and United States v. Verdoorn, 528 F.2d 103 '(8th Cir. 1976).
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review the appellant's claim regardless. For example, in United States v. Lewis, 3"
the court reviewed and rejected appellant's claim under the plain error doctrine
of Rule 52(b) ; and in United States v. Barney,"8 Judge Swygert considered the
appellant's claim of prejudice despite his failure to request a new trial, but found
no actual prejudice.
In contrast stands United States v.Johnson,'39 in which the Eighth Circuit
refused even to consider appellant's claim of prejudice because "the motions for

separate trials were not renewed at the close of the government's case or prior to
the final submission of the case to the jury; neither defendant moved for a mistrial.... Such being the case we conclude that in any event the pretrial demands
for separate trials were effectively waived.""4 °
However, it is important to note that, if the pretrial motion is not renewed
at trial, the reviewing court may only look to the facts which were before the
trial judge when he ruled on the pretrial motion.341
IV. Rule 13-Consolidation
Rule 13 provides:
The Court may order two or more indictments or informations or both to
be tried together if the offenses, and the indictments if there is more than
one, could have been joined in a single indictment or information. The procedure shall be the same as if the prosecution were under such single indictment or information.
If the prosecutor or grand jury has failed to join offenses or defendants for
trial when such would have been possible, the court may enter an order consolidating the offenses or defendants for trial purposes. A consolidation order may
be entered upon the court's own motion or pursuant to a prosecution or defense
motion. However, before ordering consolidation, the trial judge must overcome
three obstacles. First, he must ensure that the offenses of defendants charged in
the respective instruments could have been joined in a single indictment.
Secondly, he must be satisfied that the joinder meets the requirements set out in
Rule 8. If offenses are being considered for consolidation, they must satisfy Rule
8(a). If consolidation of defendants is involved, Rule 8(b) must be met.
Thirdly, the trial judge must satisfy himself that the defendant or defendants will
not be prejudiced within the meaning of Rule 14 by the joinder.342
Thus, in United States v. McDaniel,4 ' consolidation was upheld since the
consolidated defendants fulfilled Rule 8(b)'s tests. On the other hand, in United
States v. Whitehead,3 " consolidation was found to have constituted a clear abuse
of discretion, when the joinder failed to meet Rule 8(b)'s requirements.
337
338

547 F.2d 1030 (8th Cir. 1976).
371 F.2d 166 (7th Cir. 1966). See akso United States v. Verdoorn, 528 F.2d 103 (8th

Cir. 1976).
339

540 F.2d 954 (8th Cir. 1976).

340

Id. at 959.

341

United States v. Rogers, 475 F.2d 821 (7th Cir. 1973)

Haupt, 136 F.2d 661, 673 (7th Cir. 1943)).
342 United States v. Park, 531 F.2d 754, 760 (5th Cir. 1976).
343 538 F.2d 408 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
344 539 F.2d 1023 (4th Cir. 1976).

(relying on United States v.
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The decision to consolidate either offenses or defendants lies within the
sound discretion of the trial court. 4 Refusal to consolidate separate indictments
is properly within the discretion of the trial court. Yet, if the consolidation results
in misjoinder under Rule 8, a question of law completely reviewable on appeal is
raised. 4
In determining whether or not consolidation is permissible, the court must
look not only to Rules 8 and 14 to ascertain whether their joinder provisions
were met, but also to the decisions pursuant to those rules which have interpreted
them.
If multiple indictments are consolidated, the legal effect is that the separate
indictments become separate counts in one indictment. 47
V. Conclusion
Since what many attribute to be the first recorded instance of criminal-type
wrongdoing--the episode which resulted in the simultaneous condemnation and
banishment from the Garden of Eden of Adam and Eve-joinder of offenses
and wrongdoers for "prosecution" purposes has been a traditionally accepted
notion. In this nation, which affords various procedural protections to defendants
charged with crime, the practice of joinder has come to be a complex matter in
many instances. There exists a virtual myriad of subtleties and nuances of various
sorts with which lawyers practicing in federal court must be familiar. While the
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure provide some guidance in this area, judicial
opinion has become the focal point in understanding this subject. Hopefully,
these various considerations have been properly joined in this study so as to
provide a useful tool to lawyers before the federal bench.

345 United States v. Mack, 249 F.2d 321, 326 '(7th Cir. 1957), cert. denied, 356 U.S. 920
(1958).
346 531 F.2d at 754, 760.
347 205 F.2d at 23, 24.

